mirror of
https://github.com/corda/corda.git
synced 2025-02-20 17:33:15 +00:00
CORDA-1349: Docs: improve docs on permissioning, doorman and network map. (#3277)
* Docs: improve docs on permissioning, doorman and network map. * Add a convenience serialization API for Java users, marked as internal for now with a TODO to make it public after we start work on Corda 4.0. Otherwise serializing arbitrary objects to AMQP is awkward.
This commit is contained in:
parent
d620e71bb6
commit
468c0c7404
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import java.time.Instant
|
||||
* @property epoch Version number of the network parameters. Starting from 1, this will always increment on each new set
|
||||
* of parameters.
|
||||
* @property whitelistedContractImplementations List of whitelisted jars containing contract code for each contract class.
|
||||
* This will be used by [net.corda.core.contracts.WhitelistedByZoneAttachmentConstraint]. Read more about contract constraints here: <https://docs.corda.net/api-contract-constraints.html>
|
||||
* This will be used by [net.corda.core.contracts.WhitelistedByZoneAttachmentConstraint]. [You can learn more about contract constraints here](https://docs.corda.net/api-contract-constraints.html).
|
||||
* @property eventHorizon Time after which nodes will be removed from the network map if they have not been seen
|
||||
* during this period
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
||||
package net.corda.core.serialization
|
||||
|
||||
import net.corda.core.CordaInternal
|
||||
import net.corda.core.DoNotImplement
|
||||
import net.corda.core.crypto.SecureHash
|
||||
import net.corda.core.crypto.sha256
|
||||
@ -262,6 +263,24 @@ fun <T : Any> T.serialize(serializationFactory: SerializationFactory = Serializa
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@Suppress("unused")
|
||||
class SerializedBytes<T : Any>(bytes: ByteArray) : OpaqueBytes(bytes) {
|
||||
companion object {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Serializes the given object and returns a [SerializedBytes] wrapper for it. An alias for [Any.serialize]
|
||||
* intended to make the calling smoother for Java users.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* TODO: Take out the @CordaInternal annotation post-Enterprise GA when we can add API again.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @suppress
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@JvmStatic
|
||||
@CordaInternal
|
||||
@JvmOverloads
|
||||
fun <T : Any> from(obj: T, serializationFactory: SerializationFactory = SerializationFactory.defaultFactory,
|
||||
context: SerializationContext = serializationFactory.defaultContext): SerializedBytes<T> {
|
||||
return obj.serialize(serializationFactory, context)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// It's OK to use lazy here because SerializedBytes is configured to use the ImmutableClassSerializer.
|
||||
val hash: SecureHash by lazy { bytes.sha256() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -1,57 +1,55 @@
|
||||
.. highlight:: kotlin
|
||||
.. raw:: html
|
||||
|
||||
<script type="text/javascript" src="_static/jquery.js"></script>
|
||||
<script type="text/javascript" src="_static/codesets.js"></script>
|
||||
|
||||
Network permissioning
|
||||
=====================
|
||||
|
||||
.. contents::
|
||||
|
||||
Corda networks are *permissioned*. To connect to a network, a node needs three keystores in its
|
||||
``<workspace>/certificates/`` folder:
|
||||
Every Corda node is a part of a network (also called a zone), and networks are *permissioned*. To connect to a
|
||||
zone, a node needs a signed X.509 certificate from the network operator. Production deployments require a secure certificate authority.
|
||||
The issued certificates take the form of three keystores in a node's ``<workspace>/certificates/`` folder:
|
||||
|
||||
* ``truststore.jks``, which stores trusted public keys and certificates (in our case, those of the network root CA)
|
||||
* ``network-root-truststore.jks``, which stores the network/zone operator's public keys and certificates
|
||||
* ``nodekeystore.jks``, which stores the node’s identity keypairs and certificates
|
||||
* ``sslkeystore.jks``, which stores the node’s TLS keypairs and certificates
|
||||
|
||||
Production deployments require a secure certificate authority.
|
||||
Most production deployments will use an existing certificate authority or construct one using software that will be
|
||||
made available in the coming months. Until then, the documentation below can be used to create your own certificate
|
||||
authority.
|
||||
|
||||
.. note:: If you are looking for information on how to connect to the existing compatibility zone go to the section: `Connecting to a compatibility zone`_
|
||||
Most users will join an existing network such as the main Corda network or the Corda TestNet. You can also build your
|
||||
own networks. During development, no network is required because you can use the included tools to pre-create
|
||||
and pre-distribute the certificates and map files that would normally be provided dynamically by the network. Effectively
|
||||
the bootstrapper tool creates a private semi-static network for you.
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate hierarchy
|
||||
---------------------
|
||||
A Corda network has four types of certificate authorities (CAs):
|
||||
|
||||
* The **root network CA**
|
||||
* The **doorman CA**
|
||||
A Corda network has three types of certificate authorities (CAs):
|
||||
|
||||
* The doorman CA is used instead of the root network CA for day-to-day
|
||||
key signing to reduce the risk of the root network CA's private key being compromised
|
||||
* The **root network CA**, that defines the extent of a compatibility zone.
|
||||
* The **doorman CA**. The doorman CA is used instead of the root network CA for day-to-day key signing to reduce the
|
||||
risk of the root network CA's private key being compromised. This is equivalent to an intermediate certificate
|
||||
in the web PKI.
|
||||
* Each node also serves as its own CA in issuing the child certificates that it uses to sign its identity keys and TLS
|
||||
certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
* The **node CAs**
|
||||
Each certificate has an X.509 extension in it that defines the certificate/key's role in the system (see below for details).
|
||||
They also use X.509 name constraints to ensure that the X.500 names that encode a human meaningful identity are propagated
|
||||
to all the child certificates properly. The following constraints are imposed:
|
||||
|
||||
* Each node serves as its own CA in issuing the child certificates that it uses to sign its identity
|
||||
keys and TLS certificates
|
||||
* Doorman certificates are issued by a network root. Network root certs do not contain a role extension.
|
||||
* Node certificates are signed by a doorman certificate (as defined by the extension).
|
||||
* Legal identity/TLS certificates are issued by a certificate marked as node CA.
|
||||
* Confidential identity certificates are issued by a certificate marked as well known legal identity.
|
||||
* Party certificates are marked as either a well known identity or a confidential identity.
|
||||
|
||||
* The **legal identity CAs**
|
||||
|
||||
* Node's well-known legal identity, apart from signing transactions, can also issue certificates for confidential legal identities
|
||||
|
||||
The following constraints are also imposed:
|
||||
|
||||
* Doorman certificates are issued by a network root which certificate doesn't contain the extension
|
||||
* Well-known service identity certificates are issued by an entity with a Doorman certificate
|
||||
* Node CA certificates are issued by an entity with a Doorman certificate
|
||||
* Well known legal identity/TLS certificates are issued by a certificate marked as node CA
|
||||
* Confidential legal identity certificates are issued by a certificate marked as well known legal identity
|
||||
* Party certificates are marked as either a well known identity or a confidential identity
|
||||
* The structure of certificates above Doorman/Network map is intentionally left untouched, as they are not relevant to
|
||||
the identity service and therefore there is no advantage in enforcing a specific structure on those certificates. The
|
||||
certificate hierarchy consistency checks are required because nodes can issue their own certificates and can set
|
||||
their own role flags on certificates, and it's important to verify that these are set consistently with the
|
||||
certificate hierarchy design. As as side-effect this also acts as a secondary depth restriction on issued
|
||||
certificates
|
||||
|
||||
All the certificates must be issued with the custom role extension (see below).
|
||||
The structure of certificates above Doorman/Network map is intentionally left untouched, as they are not relevant to
|
||||
the identity service and therefore there is no advantage in enforcing a specific structure on those certificates. The
|
||||
certificate hierarchy consistency checks are required because nodes can issue their own certificates and can set
|
||||
their own role flags on certificates, and it's important to verify that these are set consistently with the
|
||||
certificate hierarchy design. As a side-effect this also acts as a secondary depth restriction on issued
|
||||
certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
We can visualise the permissioning structure as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -61,31 +59,27 @@ We can visualise the permissioning structure as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
Keypair and certificate formats
|
||||
-------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
You can use any standard key tools to create the required public/private keypairs and certificates. The keypairs and
|
||||
certificates must obey the following restrictions:
|
||||
|
||||
* The certificates must follow the `X.509 standard <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>`_
|
||||
|
||||
* We recommend X.509 v3 for forward compatibility
|
||||
|
||||
* The TLS certificates must follow the `TLS v1.2 standard <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>`_
|
||||
|
||||
* The root network CA, doorman CA and node CA keys, as well as the node TLS
|
||||
keys, must follow one of the following schemes:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The certificates must follow the `X.509v3 standard <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>`__
|
||||
2. The TLS certificates must follow the `TLS v1.2 standard <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>`__
|
||||
3. The root network CA, doorman CA, and node CA keys, as well as the node TLS keys, must follow one of the following schemes:
|
||||
* ECDSA using the NIST P-256 curve (secp256r1)
|
||||
|
||||
* ECDSA using the Koblitz k1 curve (secp256k1)
|
||||
* RSA with 3072-bit key size or higher.
|
||||
|
||||
* RSA with 3072-bit key size
|
||||
|
||||
.. note:: Corda's ``X509Utilities`` show how to generate the required public/private keypairs and certificates using
|
||||
Bouncy Castle. You can find the ``X509Utilities`` in the `Corda repository <https://github.com/corda/corda>`_, under
|
||||
``/node-api/src/main/kotlin/net/corda/nodeapi/internal/crypto/X509Utilities.kt``.
|
||||
The required identity and TLS keys/certificates will be automatically generated for you by the node on first run.
|
||||
However, you can also generate them manually for more control. The ``X509Utilities`` class shows how to generate the
|
||||
required public/private keypairs and certificates using Bouncy Castle. You can find the ``X509Utilities`` in the `Corda
|
||||
repository <https://github.com/corda/corda>`__, under
|
||||
``/node-api/src/main/kotlin/net/corda/nodeapi/internal/crypto/X509Utilities.kt``.
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate role extension
|
||||
--------------------------
|
||||
Corda certificates have a custom X.509 v3 extension that specifies the role the certificate relates to. This extension
|
||||
|
||||
Corda certificates have a custom X.509v3 extension that specifies the role the certificate relates to. This extension
|
||||
has the OID ``1.3.6.1.4.1.50530.1.1`` and is non-critical, so implementations outside of Corda nodes can safely ignore it.
|
||||
The extension contains a single ASN.1 integer identifying the identity type the certificate is for:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -97,98 +91,36 @@ The extension contains a single ASN.1 integer identifying the identity type the
|
||||
6. Well-known legal identity
|
||||
7. Confidential legal identity
|
||||
|
||||
In a typical installation, node administrators needn't be aware of these. However, when node certificates are managed
|
||||
by external tools (such as an existing PKI solution deployed within an organisation), it is important to understand
|
||||
these constraints.
|
||||
In a typical installation, node administrators need not be aware of these. However, if node certificates are to be
|
||||
managed by external tools, such as those provided as part of an existing PKI solution deployed within an organisation,
|
||||
it is important to recognise these extensions and the constraints noted above.
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate path validation is extended so that a certificate must contain the extension if the extension was present
|
||||
in the certificate of the issuer.
|
||||
|
||||
Creating the root and doorman CAs
|
||||
---------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Creating the root network CA's keystore and truststore
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
Manually creating the node keys
|
||||
-------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
1. Create a new keypair
|
||||
The node expects a Java-style key store (this may change in future to support PKCS#12 keystores) called ``nodekeystore.jks``,
|
||||
with the private key and certificate having an alias of "cordaclientca". This certificate should be signed by the
|
||||
doorman CA for your network. The basic constraints extension must be set to true.
|
||||
|
||||
* This will be used as the root network CA's keypair
|
||||
For the TLS keys, the basic constraints extension must be set to false. The keystore name is ``sslkeystore.jks`` and
|
||||
the key alias must be ``cordaclienttls``.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Create a self-signed certificate for the keypair. The basic constraints extension must be set to ``true``
|
||||
|
||||
* This will be used as the root network CA's certificate
|
||||
|
||||
3. Create a new keystore and store the root network CA's keypair and certificate in it for later use
|
||||
|
||||
* This keystore will be used by the root network CA to sign the doorman CA's certificate
|
||||
|
||||
4. Create a new Java keystore named ``truststore.jks`` and store the root network CA's certificate in it using the
|
||||
alias ``cordarootca``
|
||||
|
||||
* This keystore must then be provisioned to the individual nodes later so they can store it in their ``certificates`` folder
|
||||
|
||||
.. warning:: The root network CA's private key should be protected and kept safe.
|
||||
|
||||
Creating the doorman CA's keystore
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
1. Create a new keypair
|
||||
|
||||
* This will be used as the doorman CA's keypair
|
||||
|
||||
2. Obtain a certificate for the keypair signed with the root network CA key. The basic constraints extension must be
|
||||
set to ``true``
|
||||
|
||||
* This will be used as the doorman CA's certificate
|
||||
|
||||
3. Create a new keystore and store the doorman CA's keypair and certificate chain
|
||||
(i.e. the doorman CA certificate *and* the root network CA certificate) in it for later use
|
||||
|
||||
* This keystore will be used by the doorman CA to sign the nodes' identity certificates
|
||||
|
||||
Creating the node CA keystores and TLS keystores
|
||||
------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Creating the node CA keystores
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
1. For each node, create a new keypair
|
||||
|
||||
2. Obtain a certificate for the keypair signed with the doorman CA key. The basic constraints extension must be
|
||||
set to ``true``
|
||||
|
||||
3. Create a new Java keystore named ``nodekeystore.jks`` and store the keypair in it using the alias ``cordaclientca``
|
||||
|
||||
* The node will store this keystore locally to sign its identity keys and anonymous keys
|
||||
|
||||
Creating the node TLS keystores
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
1. For each node, create a new keypair
|
||||
|
||||
2. Create a certificate for the keypair signed with the node CA key. The basic constraints extension must be set to
|
||||
``false``
|
||||
|
||||
3. Create a new Java keystore named ``sslkeystore.jks`` and store the key and certificates in it using the alias
|
||||
``cordaclienttls``
|
||||
|
||||
* The node will store this keystore locally to sign its TLS certificates
|
||||
|
||||
Installing the certificates on the nodes
|
||||
----------------------------------------
|
||||
For each node, copy the following files to the node's certificate directory (``<workspace>/certificates/``):
|
||||
|
||||
1. The node's ``nodekeystore.jks`` keystore
|
||||
2. The node's ``sslkeystore.jks`` keystore
|
||||
3. The root network CA's ``truststore.jks`` keystore
|
||||
These two files should be in the node's certificate directory (``<workspace>/certificates/``), along with the network's
|
||||
own root certificates in a ``network-root-truststore.jks`` file.
|
||||
|
||||
Connecting to a compatibility zone
|
||||
----------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
To connect to a compatibility zone you need to register with their certificate signing authority (doorman) by submitting
|
||||
a certificate signing request (CSR) to obtain a valid identity for the zone.
|
||||
a certificate signing request (CSR) to obtain a valid identity for the zone. You could do this out of band, for instance
|
||||
via email or a web form, but there's also a simple request/response protocol built into Corda.
|
||||
|
||||
Before you can register, you must first have received the trust store file containing the root certificate from the zone
|
||||
operator. Then run the following command:
|
||||
operator. For high security zones this might be delivered physically. Then run the following command:
|
||||
|
||||
``java -jar corda.jar --initial-registration --network-root-truststore-password <trust store password>``
|
||||
|
||||
@ -199,9 +131,10 @@ The certificate signing request will be created based on node information obtain
|
||||
The following information from the node configuration file is needed to generate the request.
|
||||
|
||||
* **myLegalName** Your company's legal name as an X.500 string. X.500 allows differentiation between entities with the same
|
||||
name as the legal name needs to be unique on the network. If another node has already been permissioned with this
|
||||
name, as the legal name needs to be unique on the network. If another node has already been permissioned with this
|
||||
name then the permissioning server will automatically reject the request. The request will also be rejected if it
|
||||
violates legal name rules, see :ref:`node_naming` for more information.
|
||||
violates legal name rules, see :ref:`node_naming` for more information. You can use the X.500 schema to disambiguate
|
||||
entities that have the same or similar brand names.
|
||||
|
||||
* **emailAddress** e.g. "admin@company.com"
|
||||
|
||||
@ -210,14 +143,188 @@ The following information from the node configuration file is needed to generate
|
||||
* **networkServices or compatibilityZoneURL** The Corda compatibility zone services must be configured. This must be either:
|
||||
|
||||
* **compatibilityZoneURL** The Corda compatibility zone network management service root URL.
|
||||
* **networkServices** Replaces the ``compatibilityZoneURL`` when the Doorman and Network Map services
|
||||
* **networkServices** Replaces the ``compatibilityZoneURL`` when the doorman and network map services
|
||||
are configured to operate on different URL endpoints. The ``doorman`` entry is used for registration.
|
||||
|
||||
A new pair of private and public keys generated by the Corda node will be used to create the request.
|
||||
|
||||
The utility will submit the request to the doorman server and poll for a result periodically to retrieve the certificates.
|
||||
Once the request has been approved and the certificates downloaded from the server, the node will create the keystore and trust store using the certificates and the generated private key.
|
||||
The utility will submit the request to the doorman server and poll for a result periodically to retrieve the
|
||||
certificates. Once the request has been approved and the certificates downloaded from the server, the node will create
|
||||
the keystore and trust store using the certificates and the generated private key.
|
||||
|
||||
.. note:: You can exit the utility at any time if the approval process is taking longer than expected. The request process will resume on restart.
|
||||
.. note:: You can exit the utility at any time if the approval process is taking longer than expected. The request
|
||||
process will resume on restart as long as the ``--initial-registration`` flag is specified.
|
||||
|
||||
This process only is needed when the node connects to the network for the first time, or when the certificate expires.
|
||||
|
||||
Creating your own compatibility zone
|
||||
------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
This section documents how to implement your own doorman and network map servers, which is the basic process required to
|
||||
create a dedicated zone. At this time we do not provide tooling to do this, because the needs of each zone are different
|
||||
and no generic, configurable doorman codebase has been written.
|
||||
|
||||
Do you need a zone?
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
Think twice before going down this route:
|
||||
|
||||
1. It isn't necessary for testing.
|
||||
2. It isn't necessary for adding another layer of permissioning or 'know your customer' requirements onto your app.
|
||||
|
||||
**Testing.** Creating a production-ready zone isn't necessary for testing as you can use the *network bootstrapper*
|
||||
tool to create all the certificates, keys, and distribute the needed map files to run many nodes. The bootstrapper can
|
||||
create a network locally on your desktop/laptop but it also knows how to automate cloud providers via their APIs and
|
||||
using Docker. In this way you can bring up a simulation of a real Corda network with different nodes on different
|
||||
machines in the cloud for your own testing. Testing this way has several advantages, most obviously that you avoid
|
||||
race conditions in your tests caused by nodes/tests starting before all map data has propagated to all nodes.
|
||||
You can read more about the reasons for the creation of the bootstrapper tool
|
||||
`in a blog post on the design thinking behind Corda's network map infrastructure <https://medium.com/corda/cordas-new-network-map-infrastructure-8c4c248fd7f3>`__.
|
||||
|
||||
**Permissioning.** And creating a zone is also unnecessary for imposing permissioning requirements beyond that of the
|
||||
base Corda network. You can control who can use your app by creating a *business network*. A business network is what we
|
||||
call a coalition of nodes that have chosen to run a particular app within a given commercial context. Business networks
|
||||
aren't represented in the Corda API at this time, partly because the technical side is so simple. You can create one
|
||||
via a simple three step process:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Distribute a list of X.500 names that are members of your business network, e.g. a simple way to do this is by
|
||||
hosting a text file with one name per line on your website at a fixed HTTPS URL. You could also write a simple
|
||||
request/response flow that serves the list over the Corda protocol itself, although this requires the business
|
||||
network to have a node for itself.
|
||||
2. Write a bit of code that downloads and caches the contents of this file on disk, and which loads it into memory in
|
||||
the node. A good place to do this is in a class annotated with ``@CordaService``, because this class can expose
|
||||
a ``Set<Party>`` field representing the membership of your service.
|
||||
3. In your flows use ``serviceHub.findService`` to get a reference to your ``@CordaService`` class, read the list of
|
||||
members and at the start of each flow, throw a FlowException if the counterparty isn't in the membership list.
|
||||
|
||||
In this way you can impose a centrally controlled ACL that all members will collectively enforce.
|
||||
|
||||
.. note:: A production-ready Corda network and a new iteration of the testnet will be available soon.
|
||||
|
||||
Why create your own zone?
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
The primary reason to create a zone and provide the associated infrastructure is control over *network parameters*. These
|
||||
are settings that control Corda's operation, and on which all users in a network must agree. Failure to agree would create
|
||||
the Corda equivalent of a blockchain "hard fork". Parameters control things like the root of identity,
|
||||
how quickly users should upgrade, how long nodes can be offline before they are evicted from the system and so on.
|
||||
|
||||
Creating a zone involves the following steps:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Create the zone private keys and certificates. This procedure is conventional and no special knowledge is required:
|
||||
any self-signed set of certificates can be used. A professional quality zone will probably keep the keys inside a
|
||||
hardware security module (as the main Corda network and test networks do).
|
||||
2. Write a network map server.
|
||||
3. Optionally, create a doorman server.
|
||||
4. Finally, you would select and generate your network parameter file.
|
||||
|
||||
Writing a network map server
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
This server implements a simple HTTP based protocol described in the ":doc:`network-map`" page.
|
||||
The map server is responsible for gathering NodeInfo files from nodes, storing them, and distributing them back to the
|
||||
nodes in the zone. By doing this it is also responsible for choosing who is in and who is out: having a signed
|
||||
identity certificate is not enough to be a part of a Corda zone, you also need to be listed in the network map.
|
||||
It can be thought of as a DNS equivalent. If you want to de-list a user, you would do it here.
|
||||
|
||||
It is very likely that your map server won't be entirely standalone, but rather, integrated with whatever your master
|
||||
user database is.
|
||||
|
||||
The network map server also distributes signed network parameter files and controls the rollout schedule for when they
|
||||
become available for download and opt-in, and when they become enforced. This is again a policy decision you will
|
||||
probably choose to place some simple UI or workflow tooling around, in particular to enforce restrictions on who can
|
||||
edit the map or the parameters.
|
||||
|
||||
Writing a doorman server
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
This step is optional because your users can obtain a signed certificate in many different ways. The doorman protocol
|
||||
is again a very simple HTTP based approach in which a node creates keys and requests a certificate, polling until it
|
||||
gets back what it expects. However, you could also integrate this process with the rest of your signup process. For example,
|
||||
by building a tool that's integrated with your payment flow (if payment is required to take part in your zone at all).
|
||||
Alternatively you may wish to distribute USB smartcard tokens that generate the private key on first use, as is typically
|
||||
seen in national PKIs. There are many options.
|
||||
|
||||
If you do choose to make a doorman server, the bulk of the code you write will be workflow related. For instance,
|
||||
related to keeping track of an applicant as they proceed through approval. You should also impose any naming policies
|
||||
you have in the doorman process. If names are meant to match identities registered in government databases then that
|
||||
should be enforced here, alternatively, if names can be self-selected or anonymous, you would only bother with a
|
||||
deduplication check. Again it will likely be integrated with a master user database.
|
||||
|
||||
Corda does not currently provide a doorman or network map service out of the box, partly because when stripped of the
|
||||
zone specific policy there isn't much to them: just a basic HTTP server that most programmers will have favourite
|
||||
frameworks for anyway.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol is:
|
||||
|
||||
* If $URL = ``https://some.server.com/some/path``
|
||||
* Node submits a PKCS#10 certificate signing request using HTTP POST to ``$URL/certificate``. It will have a MIME
|
||||
type of ``application/octet-stream``. The ``Client-Version`` header is set to be "1.0".
|
||||
* The server returns an opaque string that references this request (let's call it ``$requestid``, or an HTTP error if something went wrong.
|
||||
* The returned request ID should be persisted to disk, to handle zones where approval may take a long time due to manual
|
||||
intervention being required.
|
||||
* The node starts polling ``$URL/$requestid`` using HTTP GET. The poll interval can be controlled by the server returning
|
||||
a response with a ``Cache-Control`` header.
|
||||
* If the request is answered with a ``200 OK`` response, the body is expected to be a zip file. Each file is expected to
|
||||
be a binary X.509 certificate, and the certs are expected to be in order.
|
||||
* If the request is answered with a ``204 No Content`` response, the node will try again later.
|
||||
* If the request is answered with a ``403 Not Authorized`` response, the node will treat that as request rejection and give up.
|
||||
* Other response codes will cause the node to abort with an exception.
|
||||
|
||||
Setting zone parameters
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
Zone parameters are stored in a file containing a Corda AMQP serialised ``SignedDataWithCert<NetworkParameters>``
|
||||
object. It is easy to create such a file with a small Java or Kotlin program. The ``NetworkParameters`` object is a
|
||||
simple data holder that could be read from e.g. a config file, or settings from a database. Signing and saving the
|
||||
resulting file is just a few lines of code. A full example can be found in ``NetworkParametersCopier.kt`` in the source
|
||||
tree, but a flavour of it looks like this:
|
||||
|
||||
.. container:: codeset
|
||||
|
||||
.. sourcecode:: java
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkParameters networkParameters = new NetworkParameters(
|
||||
4, // minPlatformVersion
|
||||
Collections.emptyList(), // notaries
|
||||
1024 * 1024 * 20, // maxMessageSize
|
||||
1024 * 1024 * 15, // maxTransactionSize
|
||||
Instant.now(), // modifiedTime
|
||||
2, // epoch
|
||||
Collections.emptyMap() // whitelist
|
||||
);
|
||||
CertificateAndKeyPair signingCertAndKeyPair = loadNetworkMapCA();
|
||||
SerializedBytes<SignedDataWithCert<NetworkParameters>> bytes = SerializedBytes.from(netMapCA.sign(networkParameters));
|
||||
Files.copy(bytes.open(), Paths.get("params-file"));
|
||||
|
||||
.. sourcecode:: kotlin
|
||||
|
||||
val networkParameters = NetworkParameters(
|
||||
minimumPlatformVersion = 4,
|
||||
notaries = listOf(...),
|
||||
maxMessageSize = 1024 * 1024 * 20 // 20mb, for example.
|
||||
maxTransactionSize = 1024 * 1024 * 15,
|
||||
modifiedTime = Instant.now(),
|
||||
epoch = 2,
|
||||
... etc ...
|
||||
)
|
||||
val signingCertAndKeyPair: CertificateAndKeyPair = loadNetworkMapCA()
|
||||
val signedParams: SerializedBytes<SignedNetworkParameters> = signingCertAndKeyPair.sign(networkParameters).serialize()
|
||||
signedParams.open().copyTo(Paths.get("/some/path"))
|
||||
|
||||
Each individual parameter is documented in `the JavaDocs/KDocs for the NetworkParameters class
|
||||
<https://docs.corda.net/api/kotlin/corda/net.corda.core.node/-network-parameters/index.html>`__. The network map
|
||||
certificate is usually chained off the root certificate, and can be created according to the instructions above. Each
|
||||
time the zone parameters are changed, the epoch should be incremented. Epochs are essentially version numbers for the
|
||||
parameters, and they therefore cannot go backwards. Once saved, the new parameters can be served by the network map server.
|
||||
|
||||
Selecting parameter values
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
How to choose the parameters? This is the most complex question facing you as a new zone operator. Some settings may seem
|
||||
straightforward and others may involve cost/benefit tradeoffs specific to your business. For example, you could choose
|
||||
to run a validating notary yourself, in which case you would (in the absence of SGX) see all the users' data. Or you could
|
||||
run a non-validating notary, with BFT fault tolerance, which implies recruiting others to take part in the cluster.
|
||||
|
||||
New network parameters will be added over time as Corda evolves. You will need to ensure that when your users upgrade,
|
||||
all the new network parameters are being served. You can ask for advice on the `corda-dev mailing list <https://groups.io/g/corda-dev>`__.
|
@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
|
||||
package net.corda.nodeapi.internal.network
|
||||
|
||||
import net.corda.core.internal.SignedDataWithCert
|
||||
import net.corda.core.internal.VisibleForTesting
|
||||
import net.corda.core.internal.copyTo
|
||||
import net.corda.core.internal.div
|
||||
import net.corda.core.node.NetworkParameters
|
||||
import net.corda.core.serialization.SerializedBytes
|
||||
import net.corda.core.serialization.serialize
|
||||
import net.corda.nodeapi.internal.createDevNetworkMapCa
|
||||
import net.corda.nodeapi.internal.crypto.CertificateAndKeyPair
|
||||
@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ class NetworkParametersCopier(
|
||||
val update: Boolean = false
|
||||
) {
|
||||
private val copyOptions = if (overwriteFile) arrayOf(StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING) else emptyArray()
|
||||
private val serialisedSignedNetParams = signingCertAndKeyPair.sign(networkParameters).serialize()
|
||||
private val serialisedSignedNetParams: SerializedBytes<SignedDataWithCert<NetworkParameters>> = signingCertAndKeyPair.sign(networkParameters).serialize()
|
||||
|
||||
fun install(nodeDir: Path) {
|
||||
val fileName = if (update) NETWORK_PARAMS_UPDATE_FILE_NAME else NETWORK_PARAMS_FILE_NAME
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user