2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
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Protocol state machines
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=======================
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This article explains our experimental approach to modelling financial protocols in code. It explains how the
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platform's state machine framework is used, and takes you through the code for a simple 2-party asset trading protocol
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which is included in the source.
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Introduction
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------------
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Shared distributed ledgers are interesting because they allow many different, mutually distrusting parties to
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share a single source of truth about the ownership of assets. Digitally signed transactions are used to update that
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shared ledger, and transactions may alter many states simultaneously and atomically.
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Blockchain systems such as Bitcoin support the idea of building up a finished, signed transaction by passing around
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partially signed invalid transactions outside of the main network, and by doing this you can implement
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*delivery versus payment* such that there is no chance of settlement failure, because the movement of cash and the
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traded asset are performed atomically by the same transaction. To perform such a trade involves a multi-step protocol
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in which messages are passed back and forth privately between parties, checked, signed and so on.
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Despite how useful these protocols are, platforms such as Bitcoin and Ethereum do not assist the developer with the rather
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tricky task of actually building them. That is unfortunate. There are many awkward problems in their implementation
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that a good platform would take care of for you, problems like:
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* Avoiding "callback hell" in which code that should ideally be sequential is turned into an unreadable mess due to the
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desire to avoid using up a thread for every protocol instantiation.
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* Surviving node shutdowns/restarts that may occur in the middle of the protocol without complicating things. This
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implies that the state of the protocol must be persisted to disk.
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* Error handling.
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* Message routing.
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* Serialisation.
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* Catching type errors, in which the developer gets temporarily confused and expects to receive/send one type of message
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when actually they need to receive/send another.
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* Unit testing of the finished protocol.
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Actor frameworks can solve some of the above but they are often tightly bound to a particular messaging layer, and
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we would like to keep a clean separation. Additionally, they are typically not type safe, and don't make persistence or
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writing sequential code much easier.
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2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
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To put these problems in perspective, the *payment channel protocol* in the bitcoinj library, which allows bitcoins to
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be temporarily moved off-chain and traded at high speed between two parties in private, consists of about 7000 lines of
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Java and took over a month of full time work to develop. Most of that code is concerned with the details of persistence,
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message passing, lifecycle management, error handling and callback management. Because the business logic is quite
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spread out the code can be difficult to read and debug.
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As small contract-specific trading protocols are a common occurence in finance, we provide a framework for the
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construction of them that automatically handles many of the concerns outlined above.
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Theory
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------
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A *continuation* is a suspended stack frame stored in a regular object that can be passed around, serialised,
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unserialised and resumed from where it was suspended. This concept is sometimes referred to as "fibers". This may
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sound abstract but don't worry, the examples below will make it clearer. The JVM does not natively support
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continuations, so we implement them using a library called Quasar which works through behind-the-scenes
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bytecode rewriting. You don't have to know how this works to benefit from it, however.
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We use continuations for the following reasons:
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* It allows us to write code that is free of callbacks, that looks like ordinary sequential code.
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* A suspended continuation takes far less memory than a suspended thread. It can be as low as a few hundred bytes.
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In contrast a suspended Java stack can easily be 1mb in size.
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* It frees the developer from thinking (much) about persistence and serialisation.
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A *state machine* is a piece of code that moves through various *states*. These are not the same as states in the data
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model (that represent facts about the world on the ledger), but rather indicate different stages in the progression
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of a multi-stage protocol. Typically writing a state machine would require the use of a big switch statement and some
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explicit variables to keep track of where you're up to. The use of continuations avoids this hassle.
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A two party trading protocol
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----------------------------
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We would like to implement the "hello world" of shared transaction building protocols: a seller wishes to sell some
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*asset* (e.g. some commercial paper) in return for *cash*. The buyer wishes to purchase the asset using his cash. They
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want the trade to be atomic so neither side is exposed to the risk of settlement failure. We assume that the buyer
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and seller have found each other and arranged the details on some exchange, or over the counter. The details of how
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the trade is arranged isn't covered in this article.
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Our protocol has two parties (B and S for buyer and seller) and will proceed as follows:
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1. S sends a ``StateAndRef`` pointing to the state they want to sell to B, along with info about the price they require
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B to pay.
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2. B sends to S a ``SignedTransaction`` that includes the state as input, B's cash as input, the state with the new
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owner key as output, and any change cash as output. It contains a single signature from B but isn't valid because
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it lacks a signature from S authorising movement of the asset.
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3. S signs it and hands the now finalised ``SignedTransaction`` back to B.
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You can find the implementation of this protocol in the file ``contracts/protocols/TwoPartyTradeProtocol.kt``.
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Assuming no malicious termination, they both end the protocol being in posession of a valid, signed transaction that
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represents an atomic asset swap.
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Note that it's the *seller* who initiates contact with the buyer, not vice-versa as you might imagine.
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2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
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We start by defining a wrapper that namespaces the protocol code, two functions to start either the buy or sell side
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of the protocol, and two classes that will contain the protocol definition. We also pick what data will be used by
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each side.
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.. container:: codeset
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.. sourcecode:: kotlin
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object TwoPartyTradeProtocol {
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val TRADE_TOPIC = "platform.trade"
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fun runSeller(smm: StateMachineManager, timestampingAuthority: LegallyIdentifiableNode,
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otherSide: SingleMessageRecipient, assetToSell: StateAndRef<OwnableState>, price: Amount,
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myKeyPair: KeyPair, buyerSessionID: Long): ListenableFuture<Pair<WireTransaction, LedgerTransaction>> {
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val seller = Seller(otherSide, timestampingAuthority, assetToSell, price, myKeyPair, buyerSessionID)
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smm.add("$TRADE_TOPIC.seller", seller)
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return seller.resultFuture
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}
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fun runBuyer(smm: StateMachineManager, timestampingAuthority: LegallyIdentifiableNode,
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otherSide: SingleMessageRecipient, acceptablePrice: Amount, typeToBuy: Class<out OwnableState>,
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sessionID: Long): ListenableFuture<Pair<WireTransaction, LedgerTransaction>> {
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val buyer = Buyer(otherSide, timestampingAuthority.identity, acceptablePrice, typeToBuy, sessionID)
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smm.add("$TRADE_TOPIC.buyer", buyer)
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return buyer.resultFuture
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}
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2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
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// This object is serialised to the network and is the first protocol message the seller sends to the buyer.
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class SellerTradeInfo(
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val assetForSale: StateAndRef<OwnableState>,
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val price: Amount,
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val sellerOwnerKey: PublicKey,
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val sessionID: Long
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)
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class SignaturesFromSeller(val timestampAuthoritySig: DigitalSignature.WithKey, val sellerSig: DigitalSignature.WithKey)
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class Seller(val otherSide: SingleMessageRecipient,
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val timestampingAuthority: LegallyIdentifiableNode,
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val assetToSell: StateAndRef<OwnableState>,
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val price: Amount,
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val myKeyPair: KeyPair,
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val buyerSessionID: Long) : ProtocolStateMachine<Pair<WireTransaction, LedgerTransaction>>() {
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@Suspendable
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override fun call(): Pair<WireTransaction, LedgerTransaction> {
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TODO()
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}
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}
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class UnacceptablePriceException(val givenPrice: Amount) : Exception()
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class AssetMismatchException(val expectedTypeName: String, val typeName: String) : Exception() {
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override fun toString() = "The submitted asset didn't match the expected type: $expectedTypeName vs $typeName"
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}
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class Buyer(val otherSide: SingleMessageRecipient,
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val timestampingAuthority: Party,
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val acceptablePrice: Amount,
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val typeToBuy: Class<out OwnableState>,
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val sessionID: Long) : ProtocolStateMachine<Pair<WireTransaction, LedgerTransaction>>() {
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@Suspendable
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override fun call(): Pair<WireTransaction, LedgerTransaction> {
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TODO()
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}
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}
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}
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Let's unpack what this code does:
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- It defines a several classes nested inside the main ``TwoPartyTradeProtocol`` singleton, and a couple of methods, one
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to run the buyer side of the protocol and one to run the seller side. Some of the classes are simply protocol messages.
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- It defines the "trade topic", which is just a string that namespaces this protocol. The prefix "platform." is reserved
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by the DLG, but you can define your own protocols using standard Java-style reverse DNS notation.
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- The ``runBuyer`` and ``runSeller`` methods take a number of parameters that specialise the protocol for this run,
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use them to construct a ``Buyer`` or ``Seller`` object respectively, and then add the new instances to the
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``StateMachineManager``. The purpose of this class is described below. The ``smm.add`` method takes a logger name as
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the first parameter, this is just a standard JDK logging identifier string, and the instance to add.
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Going through the data needed to become a seller, we have:
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- ``timestampingAuthority: LegallyIdentifiableNode`` - a reference to a node on the P2P network that acts as a trusted
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timestamper. The use of timestamping is described in :doc:`data-model`.
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- ``otherSide: SingleMessageRecipient`` - the network address of the node with which you are trading.
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- ``assetToSell: StateAndRef<OwnableState>`` - a pointer to the ledger entry that represents the thing being sold.
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- ``price: Amount`` - the agreed on price that the asset is being sold for.
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- ``myKeyPair: KeyPair`` - the key pair that controls the asset being sold. It will be used to sign the transaction.
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- ``buyerSessionID: Long`` - a unique number that identifies this trade to the buyer. It is expected that the buyer
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knows that the trade is going to take place and has sent you such a number already. (This field may go away in a future
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iteration of the framework)
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2015-12-15 12:16:13 +00:00
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.. note:: Session IDs keep different traffic streams separated, so for security they must be large and random enough
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to be unguessable. 63 bits is good enough.
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And for the buyer:
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- ``acceptablePrice: Amount`` - the price that was agreed upon out of band. If the seller specifies a price less than
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or equal to this, then the trade will go ahead.
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- ``typeToBuy: Class<out OwnableState>`` - the type of state that is being purchased. This is used to check that the
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sell side of the protocol isn't trying to sell us the wrong thing, whether by accident or on purpose.
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- ``sessionID: Long`` - the session ID that was handed to the seller in order to start the protocol.
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The run methods return a ``ListenableFuture`` that will complete when the protocol has finished.
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Alright, so using this protocol shouldn't be too hard: in the simplest case we can just pass in the details of the trade
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to either runBuyer or runSeller, depending on who we are, and then call ``.get()`` on resulting object to
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block the calling thread until the protocol has finished. Or we could register a callback on the returned future that
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will be invoked when it's done, where we could e.g. update a user interface.
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2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
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Finally, we define a couple of exceptions, and two classes that will be used as a protocol message called
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``SellerTradeInfo`` and ``SignaturesFromSeller``.
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Suspendable methods
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-------------------
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The ``call`` method of the buyer/seller classes is marked with the ``@Suspendable`` annotation. What does this mean?
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As mentioned above, our protocol framework will at points suspend the code and serialise it to disk. For this to work,
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any methods on the call stack must have been pre-marked as ``@Suspendable`` so the bytecode rewriter knows to modify
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the underlying code to support this new feature. A protocol is suspended when calling either ``receive``, ``send`` or
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``sendAndReceive`` which we will learn more about below. For now, just be aware that when one of these methods is
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invoked, all methods on the stack must have been marked. If you forget, then in the unit test environment you will
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get a useful error message telling you which methods you didn't mark. The fix is simple enough: just add the annotation
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and try again.
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.. note:: A future version of Java is likely to remove this pre-marking requirement completely.
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The state machine manager
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-------------------------
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The SMM is a class responsible for taking care of all running protocols in a node. It knows how to register handlers
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with a ``MessagingService`` and iterate the right state machine when messages arrive. It provides the
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send/receive/sendAndReceive calls that let the code request network interaction and it will store a serialised copy of
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each state machine before it's suspended to wait for the network.
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To get a ``StateMachineManager``, you currently have to build one by passing in a ``ServiceHub`` and a thread or thread
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pool which it can use. This will change in future so don't worry about the details of this too much: just check the
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unit tests to see how it's done.
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Implementing the seller
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-----------------------
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Let's implement the ``Seller.call`` method. This will be invoked by the platform when the protocol is started by the
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``StateMachineManager``.
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.. container:: codeset
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.. sourcecode:: kotlin
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2016-02-12 14:42:25 +00:00
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val partialTX: SignedTransaction = receiveAndCheckProposedTransaction()
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// These two steps could be done in parallel, in theory. Our framework doesn't support that yet though.
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val ourSignature = signWithOurKey(partialTX)
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val tsaSig = timestamp(partialTX)
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val ledgerTX = sendSignatures(partialTX, ourSignature, tsaSig)
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return Pair(partialTX.tx, ledgerTX)
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Here we see the outline of the procedure. We receive a proposed trade transaction from the buyer and check that it's
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valid. Then we sign with our own key, request a timestamping authority to assert with another signature that the
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timestamp in the transaction (if any) is valid, and finally we send back both our signature and the TSA's signature.
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Finally, we hand back to the code that invoked the protocol the finished transaction in a couple of different forms.
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Let's fill out the ``receiveAndCheckProposedTransaction()`` method.
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.. container:: codeset
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.. sourcecode:: kotlin
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@Suspendable
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open fun receiveAndCheckProposedTransaction(): SignedTransaction {
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val sessionID = random63BitValue()
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// Make the first message we'll send to kick off the protocol.
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val hello = SellerTradeInfo(assetToSell, price, myKeyPair.public, sessionID)
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val maybePartialTX = sendAndReceive(TRADE_TOPIC, buyerSessionID, sessionID, hello, SignedTransaction::class.java)
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val partialTX = maybePartialTX.validate {
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it.verifySignatures()
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logger.trace { "Received partially signed transaction" }
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val wtx: WireTransaction = it.tx
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requireThat {
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"transaction sends us the right amount of cash" by (wtx.outputs.sumCashBy(myKeyPair.public) == price)
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// There are all sorts of funny games a malicious secondary might play here, we should fix them:
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//
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// - This tx may attempt to send some assets we aren't intending to sell to the secondary, if
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// we're reusing keys! So don't reuse keys!
|
|
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|
// - This tx may not be valid according to the contracts of the input states, so we must resolve
|
|
|
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// and fully audit the transaction chains to convince ourselves that it is actually valid.
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|
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|
// - This tx may include output states that impose odd conditions on the movement of the cash,
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// once we implement state pairing.
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//
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// but the goal of this code is not to be fully secure, but rather, just to find good ways to
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// express protocol state machines on top of the messaging layer.
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|
}
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|
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|
}
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|
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|
return partialTX
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
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|
2015-12-15 14:52:07 +00:00
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That's pretty straightforward. We generate a session ID to identify what's happening on the seller side, fill out
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
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the initial protocol message, and then call ``sendAndReceive``. This function takes a few arguments:
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- The topic string that ensures the message is routed to the right bit of code in the other side's node.
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- The session IDs that ensure the messages don't get mixed up with other simultaneous trades.
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
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- The thing to send. It'll be serialised and sent automatically.
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- Finally a type argument, which is the kind of object we're expecting to receive from the other side.
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
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|
2016-02-12 14:42:25 +00:00
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It returns a simple wrapper class, ``UntrustworthyData<SignedTransaction>``, which is just a marker class that reminds
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
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us that the data came from a potentially malicious external source and may have been tampered with or be unexpected in
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other ways. It doesn't add any functionality, but acts as a reminder to "scrub" the data before use. Here, our scrubbing
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simply involves checking the signatures on it. Then we could go ahead and do some more involved checks.
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|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
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Once sendAndReceive is called, the call method will be suspended into a continuation. When it gets back we'll do a log
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message. The buyer is supposed to send us a transaction with all the right inputs/outputs/commands in return, with their
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cash put into the transaction and their signature on it authorising the movement of the cash.
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|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
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|
|
.. note:: There are a couple of rules you need to bear in mind when writing a class that will be used as a continuation.
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
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The first is that anything on the stack when the function is suspended will be stored into the heap and kept alive by
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the garbage collector. So try to avoid keeping enormous data structures alive unless you really have to.
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The second is that as well as being kept on the heap, objects reachable from the stack will be serialised. The state
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|
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of the function call may be resurrected much later! Kryo doesn't require objects be marked as serialisable, but even so,
|
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|
|
doing things like creating threads from inside these calls would be a bad idea. They should only contain business
|
|
|
|
logic.
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|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
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|
|
Here's the rest of the code:
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
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|
.. container:: codeset
|
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.. sourcecode:: kotlin
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|
2016-02-12 14:42:25 +00:00
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|
|
open fun signWithOurKey(partialTX: SignedTransaction) = myKeyPair.signWithECDSA(partialTX.txBits)
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
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|
|
@Suspendable
|
2016-02-12 14:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
open fun timestamp(partialTX: SignedTransaction): DigitalSignature.LegallyIdentifiable {
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
return TimestamperClient(this, timestampingAuthority).timestamp(partialTX.txBits)
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
@Suspendable
|
2016-02-12 14:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
open fun sendSignatures(partialTX: SignedTransaction, ourSignature: DigitalSignature.WithKey,
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
tsaSig: DigitalSignature.LegallyIdentifiable): LedgerTransaction {
|
|
|
|
val fullySigned = partialTX + tsaSig + ourSignature
|
|
|
|
val ltx = fullySigned.verifyToLedgerTransaction(serviceHub.identityService)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// TODO: We should run it through our full TransactionGroup of all transactions here.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.trace { "Built finished transaction, sending back to secondary!" }
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
send(TRADE_TOPIC, otherSide, buyerSessionID, SignaturesFromSeller(tsaSig, ourSignature))
|
|
|
|
return ltx
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
It's should be all pretty straightforward: here, ``txBits`` is the raw byte array representing the transaction.
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
In ``sendSignatures``, we take the two signatures we calculated, then add them to the partial transaction we were sent
|
|
|
|
and verify that the signatures all make sense. This should never fail: it's just a sanity check. Finally, we wrap the
|
|
|
|
two signatures in a simple wrapper message class and send it back. The send won't block waiting for an acknowledgement,
|
|
|
|
but the underlying message queue software will retry delivery if the other side has gone away temporarily.
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. warning:: This code is **not secure**. Other than not checking for all possible invalid constructions, if the
|
|
|
|
seller stops before sending the finalised transaction to the buyer, the seller is left with a valid transaction
|
|
|
|
but the buyer isn't, so they can't spend the asset they just purchased! This sort of thing will be fixed in a
|
|
|
|
future version of the code.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Implementing the buyer
|
|
|
|
----------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OK, let's do the same for the buyer side:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. container:: codeset
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. sourcecode:: kotlin
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
@Suspendable
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
override fun call(): Pair<WireTransaction, LedgerTransaction> {
|
|
|
|
val tradeRequest = receiveAndValidateTradeRequest()
|
|
|
|
val (ptx, cashSigningPubKeys) = assembleSharedTX(tradeRequest)
|
|
|
|
val stx = signWithOurKeys(cashSigningPubKeys, ptx)
|
|
|
|
val signatures = swapSignaturesWithSeller(stx, tradeRequest.sessionID)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.trace { "Got signatures from seller, verifying ... "}
|
|
|
|
val fullySigned = stx + signatures.timestampAuthoritySig + signatures.sellerSig
|
|
|
|
val ltx = fullySigned.verifyToLedgerTransaction(serviceHub.identityService)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
logger.trace { "Fully signed transaction was valid. Trade complete! :-)" }
|
|
|
|
return Pair(fullySigned.tx, ltx)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@Suspendable
|
|
|
|
open fun receiveAndValidateTradeRequest(): SellerTradeInfo {
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
// Wait for a trade request to come in on our pre-provided session ID.
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
val maybeTradeRequest = receive(TRADE_TOPIC, sessionID, SellerTradeInfo::class.java)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
val tradeRequest = maybeTradeRequest.validate {
|
|
|
|
// What is the seller trying to sell us?
|
|
|
|
val assetTypeName = it.assetForSale.state.javaClass.name
|
|
|
|
logger.trace { "Got trade request for a $assetTypeName" }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check the start message for acceptability.
|
|
|
|
check(it.sessionID > 0)
|
|
|
|
if (it.price > acceptablePrice)
|
|
|
|
throw UnacceptablePriceException(it.price)
|
|
|
|
if (!typeToBuy.isInstance(it.assetForSale.state))
|
|
|
|
throw AssetMismatchException(typeToBuy.name, assetTypeName)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
// TODO: Either look up the stateref here in our local db, or accept a long chain of states and
|
|
|
|
// validate them to audit the other side and ensure it actually owns the state we are being offered!
|
|
|
|
// For now, just assume validity!
|
|
|
|
return tradeRequest
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
@Suspendable
|
2016-02-12 14:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
open fun swapSignaturesWithSeller(stx: SignedTransaction, theirSessionID: Long): SignaturesFromSeller {
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
logger.trace { "Sending partially signed transaction to seller" }
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
// TODO: Protect against the seller terminating here and leaving us in the lurch without the final tx.
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
return sendAndReceive(TRADE_TOPIC, otherSide, theirSessionID, sessionID, stx, SignaturesFromSeller::class.java).validate {}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-12 14:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
open fun signWithOurKeys(cashSigningPubKeys: List<PublicKey>, ptx: TransactionBuilder): SignedTransaction {
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
// Now sign the transaction with whatever keys we need to move the cash.
|
|
|
|
for (k in cashSigningPubKeys) {
|
|
|
|
val priv = serviceHub.keyManagementService.toPrivate(k)
|
|
|
|
ptx.signWith(KeyPair(k, priv))
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
val stx = ptx.toSignedTransaction(checkSufficientSignatures = false)
|
|
|
|
stx.verifySignatures() // Verifies that we generated a signed transaction correctly.
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
// TODO: Could run verify() here to make sure the only signature missing is the sellers.
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
return stx
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
open fun assembleSharedTX(tradeRequest: SellerTradeInfo): Pair<TransactionBuilder, List<PublicKey>> {
|
|
|
|
val ptx = TransactionBuilder()
|
|
|
|
// Add input and output states for the movement of cash, by using the Cash contract to generate the states.
|
|
|
|
val wallet = serviceHub.walletService.currentWallet
|
|
|
|
val cashStates = wallet.statesOfType<Cash.State>()
|
|
|
|
val cashSigningPubKeys = Cash().generateSpend(ptx, tradeRequest.price, tradeRequest.sellerOwnerKey, cashStates)
|
|
|
|
// Add inputs/outputs/a command for the movement of the asset.
|
|
|
|
ptx.addInputState(tradeRequest.assetForSale.ref)
|
|
|
|
// Just pick some new public key for now. This won't be linked with our identity in any way, which is what
|
|
|
|
// we want for privacy reasons: the key is here ONLY to manage and control ownership, it is not intended to
|
|
|
|
// reveal who the owner actually is. The key management service is expected to derive a unique key from some
|
|
|
|
// initial seed in order to provide privacy protection.
|
|
|
|
val freshKey = serviceHub.keyManagementService.freshKey()
|
|
|
|
val (command, state) = tradeRequest.assetForSale.state.withNewOwner(freshKey.public)
|
|
|
|
ptx.addOutputState(state)
|
|
|
|
ptx.addCommand(command, tradeRequest.assetForSale.state.owner)
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
// And add a request for timestamping: it may be that none of the contracts need this! But it can't hurt
|
|
|
|
// to have one.
|
|
|
|
ptx.setTime(Instant.now(), timestampingAuthority, 30.seconds)
|
|
|
|
return Pair(ptx, cashSigningPubKeys)
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-13 12:54:10 +00:00
|
|
|
This code is longer but still fairly straightforward. Here are some things to pay attention to:
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. We do some sanity checking on the received message to ensure we're being offered what we expected to be offered.
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
2. We create a cash spend in the normal way, by using ``Cash().generateSpend``. See the contracts tutorial if this isn't
|
2015-12-15 14:52:07 +00:00
|
|
|
clear.
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
3. We access the *service hub* when we need it to access things that are transient and may change or be recreated
|
|
|
|
whilst a protocol is suspended, things like the wallet or the timestamping service. Remember that a protocol may
|
|
|
|
be suspended when it waits to receive a message across node or computer restarts, so objects representing a service
|
|
|
|
or data which may frequently change should be accessed 'just in time'.
|
2016-02-09 14:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
4. Finally, we send the unfinished, invalid transaction to the seller so they can sign it. They are expected to send
|
|
|
|
back to us a ``SignaturesFromSeller``, which once we verify it, should be the final outcome of the trade.
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As you can see, the protocol logic is straightforward and does not contain any callbacks or network glue code, despite
|
|
|
|
the fact that it takes minimal resources and can survive node restarts.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. warning:: When accessing things via the ``serviceHub`` field, avoid the temptation to stuff a reference into a local variable.
|
|
|
|
If you do this then next time your protocol waits to receive an object, the system will try and serialise all your
|
|
|
|
local variables and end up trying to serialise, e.g. the timestamping service, which doesn't make any conceptual
|
|
|
|
sense. The ``serviceHub`` field is defined by the ``ProtocolStateMachine`` superclass and is marked transient so
|
2015-12-15 14:52:07 +00:00
|
|
|
this problem doesn't occur. It's also restored for you when a protocol state machine is restored after a node
|
2015-12-14 17:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
restart.
|
|
|
|
|