mirror of
https://github.com/zerotier/ZeroTierOne.git
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344a25c133
- ZT will only drop root privileges if zerotier-one user exists. It is created by Debian postinst script - in other cases the user has to be created by administrator. - Linux >=4.3 with ambient capabilities is required, otherwise ZT will silently - "-U" option now also disables privileges dropping
165 lines
4.8 KiB
C++
165 lines
4.8 KiB
C++
#include "LinuxDropPrivileges.hpp"
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/securebits.h>
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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namespace ZeroTier {
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#ifndef PR_CAP_AMBIENT
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// if we are on old libc, dropPrivileges is nop
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void dropPrivileges(std::string homeDir) {}
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#else
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const char* TARGET_USER_NAME = "zerotier-one";
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struct cap_header_struct {
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__u32 version;
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int pid;
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};
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struct cap_data_struct {
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__u32 effective;
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__u32 permitted;
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__u32 inheritable;
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};
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// libc doesn't export capset, it is instead located in libcap
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// We ignore libcap and call it manually.
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int capset(cap_header_struct* hdrp, cap_data_struct* datap) {
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return syscall(SYS_capset, hdrp, datap);
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}
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void notDropping(std::string homeDir) {
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struct stat buf;
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if (lstat(homeDir.c_str(), &buf) < 0) {
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if (buf.st_uid != 0 || buf.st_gid != 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: failed to drop privileges. Refusing to run as root, because %s was already used in nonprivileged mode.\n", homeDir.c_str());
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exit(1);
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}
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}
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fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: failed to drop privileges, running as root\n");
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}
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int setCapabilities(int flags) {
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cap_header_struct capheader = {_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1, 0};
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cap_data_struct capdata;
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capdata.inheritable = capdata.permitted = capdata.effective = flags;
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return capset(&capheader, &capdata);
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}
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void createOwnedHomedir(std::string homeDir, struct passwd* targetUser) {
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struct stat buf;
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if (lstat(homeDir.c_str(), &buf) < 0) {
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if (errno == ENOENT) {
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mkdir(homeDir.c_str(), 0755);
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} else {
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perror("cannot access home directory");
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exit(1);
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}
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}
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if (buf.st_uid != 0 || buf.st_gid != 0) {
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// should be already owned by zerotier-one
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if (targetUser->pw_uid != buf.st_uid) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: %s not owned by zerotier-one or root\n", homeDir.c_str());
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exit(1);
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}
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return;
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}
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// Change homedir owner to zerotier-one user. This is safe, because this directory is writable only by root, so no one could have created malicious hardlink.
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long p = (long)fork();
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int exitcode = -1;
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if (p > 0) {
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waitpid(p, &exitcode, 0);
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} else if (p == 0) {
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std::string ownerString = std::to_string(targetUser->pw_uid) + ":" + std::to_string(targetUser->pw_gid);
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execlp("chown", "chown", "-R", ownerString.c_str(), "--", homeDir.c_str(), NULL);
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_exit(-1);
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}
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if (exitcode != 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "failed to change owner of %s to %s\n", homeDir.c_str(), targetUser->pw_name);
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exit(1);
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}
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}
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void dropPrivileges(std::string homeDir) {
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// dropPrivileges switches to zerotier-one user while retaining CAP_NET_ADMIN
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// and CAP_NET_RAW capabilities.
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struct passwd* targetUser = getpwnam(TARGET_USER_NAME);
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if (targetUser == NULL) {
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// zerotier-one user not configured by package
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return;
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}
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if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, CAP_NET_RAW, 0, 0) < 0) {
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// Kernel has no support for ambient capabilities.
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notDropping(homeDir);
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return;
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}
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if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS | SECBIT_NOROOT) < 0) {
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notDropping(homeDir);
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return;
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}
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createOwnedHomedir(homeDir, targetUser);
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if (setCapabilities((1 << CAP_NET_ADMIN) | (1 << CAP_NET_RAW) | (1 << CAP_SETUID) | (1 << CAP_SETGID)) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: failed to set capabilities (not running as real root?)\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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int oldDumpable = prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE);
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if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) < 0) {
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// Disable ptracing. Otherwise there is a small window when previous
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// compromised ZeroTier process could ptrace us, when we still have CAP_SETUID.
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// (this is mitigated anyway on most distros by ptrace_scope=1)
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perror("prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)");
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exit(1);
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}
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if (setgid(targetUser->pw_gid) < 0) {
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perror("setgid");
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exit(1);
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}
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if (setuid(targetUser->pw_uid) < 0) {
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perror("setuid");
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exit(1);
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}
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if (setCapabilities((1 << CAP_NET_ADMIN) | (1 << CAP_NET_RAW)) < 0) {
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perror("could not drop capabilities after setuid");
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exit(1);
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}
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if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, oldDumpable) < 0) {
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perror("could not restore dumpable flag");
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exit(1);
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}
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if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, CAP_NET_ADMIN, 0, 0) < 0) {
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perror("could not raise ambient CAP_NET_ADMIN");
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exit(1);
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}
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if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, CAP_NET_RAW, 0, 0) < 0) {
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perror("could not raise ambient CAP_NET_RAW");
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exit(1);
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}
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}
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#endif
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}
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