mirror of
https://github.com/zerotier/ZeroTierOne.git
synced 2024-12-20 05:28:01 +00:00
113 lines
4.9 KiB
C++
113 lines
4.9 KiB
C++
/*
|
|
* Copyright (c)2019 ZeroTier, Inc.
|
|
*
|
|
* Use of this software is governed by the Business Source License included
|
|
* in the LICENSE.TXT file in the project's root directory.
|
|
*
|
|
* Change Date: 2023-01-01
|
|
*
|
|
* On the date above, in accordance with the Business Source License, use
|
|
* of this software will be governed by version 2.0 of the Apache License.
|
|
*/
|
|
/****/
|
|
|
|
#include "Constants.hpp"
|
|
#include "RuntimeEnvironment.hpp"
|
|
#include "Credential.hpp"
|
|
#include "Capability.hpp"
|
|
#include "Tag.hpp"
|
|
#include "CertificateOfMembership.hpp"
|
|
#include "CertificateOfOwnership.hpp"
|
|
#include "Revocation.hpp"
|
|
#include "Switch.hpp"
|
|
#include "Network.hpp"
|
|
#include "ScopedPtr.hpp"
|
|
|
|
namespace ZeroTier {
|
|
|
|
template<typename CRED>
|
|
static ZT_ALWAYS_INLINE Credential::VerifyResult _credVerify(const RuntimeEnvironment *const RR,void *tPtr,CRED credential)
|
|
{
|
|
const Address signedBy(credential.signer());
|
|
const uint64_t networkId = credential.networkId();
|
|
if ((!signedBy)||(signedBy != Network::controllerFor(networkId)))
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
|
|
const Identity id(RR->topology->getIdentity(tPtr,signedBy));
|
|
if (!id) {
|
|
RR->sw->requestWhois(tPtr,RR->node->now(),signedBy);
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_NEED_IDENTITY;
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
ScopedPtr< Buffer<(sizeof(CRED) + 64)> > tmp(new Buffer<(sizeof(CRED) + 64)>());
|
|
credential.serialize(*tmp,true);
|
|
const Credential::VerifyResult result = (id.verify(tmp->data(),tmp->size(),credential.signature(),credential.signatureLength()) ? Credential::VERIFY_OK : Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
return result;
|
|
} catch ( ... ) {}
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Credential::VerifyResult Credential::_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *const RR,void *tPtr,const Revocation &credential) const { return _credVerify(RR,tPtr,credential); }
|
|
Credential::VerifyResult Credential::_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *const RR,void *tPtr,const Tag &credential) const { return _credVerify(RR,tPtr,credential); }
|
|
Credential::VerifyResult Credential::_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *const RR,void *tPtr,const CertificateOfOwnership &credential) const { return _credVerify(RR,tPtr,credential); }
|
|
|
|
Credential::VerifyResult Credential::_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *const RR,void *tPtr,const CertificateOfMembership &credential) const
|
|
{
|
|
if ((!credential._signedBy)||(credential._signedBy != Network::controllerFor(credential.networkId()))||(credential._qualifierCount > ZT_NETWORK_COM_MAX_QUALIFIERS))
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
|
|
|
|
const Identity id(RR->topology->getIdentity(tPtr,credential._signedBy));
|
|
if (!id) {
|
|
RR->sw->requestWhois(tPtr,RR->node->now(),credential._signedBy);
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_NEED_IDENTITY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint64_t buf[ZT_NETWORK_COM_MAX_QUALIFIERS * 3];
|
|
unsigned int ptr = 0;
|
|
for(unsigned int i=0;i<credential._qualifierCount;++i) {
|
|
buf[ptr++] = Utils::hton(credential._qualifiers[i].id);
|
|
buf[ptr++] = Utils::hton(credential._qualifiers[i].value);
|
|
buf[ptr++] = Utils::hton(credential._qualifiers[i].maxDelta);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (id.verify(buf,ptr * sizeof(uint64_t),credential._signature,credential._signatureLength) ? Credential::VERIFY_OK : Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Credential::VerifyResult Credential::_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const Capability &credential) const
|
|
{
|
|
try {
|
|
// There must be at least one entry, and sanity check for bad chain max length
|
|
if ((credential._maxCustodyChainLength < 1)||(credential._maxCustodyChainLength > ZT_MAX_CAPABILITY_CUSTODY_CHAIN_LENGTH))
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
|
|
|
|
// Validate all entries in chain of custody
|
|
Buffer<(sizeof(Capability) * 2)> tmp;
|
|
credential.serialize(tmp,true);
|
|
for(unsigned int c=0;c<credential._maxCustodyChainLength;++c) {
|
|
if (c == 0) {
|
|
if ((!credential._custody[c].to)||(!credential._custody[c].from)||(credential._custody[c].from != Network::controllerFor(credential._nwid)))
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE; // the first entry must be present and from the network's controller
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!credential._custody[c].to)
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_OK; // all previous entries were valid, so we are valid
|
|
else if ((!credential._custody[c].from)||(credential._custody[c].from != credential._custody[c-1].to))
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE; // otherwise if we have another entry it must be from the previous holder in the chain
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const Identity id(RR->topology->getIdentity(tPtr,credential._custody[c].from));
|
|
if (id) {
|
|
if (!id.verify(tmp.data(),tmp.size(),credential._custody[c].signature,credential._custody[c].signatureLength))
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
RR->sw->requestWhois(tPtr,RR->node->now(),credential._custody[c].from);
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_NEED_IDENTITY;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We reached max custody chain length and everything was valid
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_OK;
|
|
} catch ( ... ) {}
|
|
return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace ZeroTier
|