/* * Copyright (c)2019 ZeroTier, Inc. * * Use of this software is governed by the Business Source License included * in the LICENSE.TXT file in the project's root directory. * * Change Date: 2023-01-01 * * On the date above, in accordance with the Business Source License, use * of this software will be governed by version 2.0 of the Apache License. */ /****/ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "Constants.hpp" #ifdef __UNIX_LIKE__ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #endif #ifdef __WINDOWS__ #include #endif #include "Utils.hpp" #include "Mutex.hpp" #include "Salsa20.hpp" namespace ZeroTier { const char Utils::HEXCHARS[16] = { '0','1','2','3','4','5','6','7','8','9','a','b','c','d','e','f' }; // Crazy hack to force memory to be securely zeroed in spite of the best efforts of optimizing compilers. static void _Utils_doBurn(volatile uint8_t *ptr,unsigned int len) { volatile uint8_t *const end = ptr + len; while (ptr != end) *(ptr++) = (uint8_t)0; } static void (*volatile _Utils_doBurn_ptr)(volatile uint8_t *,unsigned int) = _Utils_doBurn; void Utils::burn(void *ptr,unsigned int len) { (_Utils_doBurn_ptr)((volatile uint8_t *)ptr,len); } static unsigned long _Utils_itoa(unsigned long n,char *s) { if (n == 0) return 0; unsigned long pos = _Utils_itoa(n / 10,s); if (pos >= 22) // sanity check, should be impossible pos = 22; s[pos] = '0' + (char)(n % 10); return pos + 1; } char *Utils::decimal(unsigned long n,char s[24]) { if (n == 0) { s[0] = '0'; s[1] = (char)0; return s; } s[_Utils_itoa(n,s)] = (char)0; return s; } void Utils::getSecureRandom(void *buf,unsigned int bytes) { static Mutex globalLock; static Salsa20 s20; static bool s20Initialized = false; static uint8_t randomBuf[65536]; static unsigned int randomPtr = sizeof(randomBuf); Mutex::Lock _l(globalLock); /* Just for posterity we Salsa20 encrypt the result of whatever system * CSPRNG we use. There have been several bugs at the OS or OS distribution * level in the past that resulted in systematically weak or predictable * keys due to random seeding problems. This mitigates that by grabbing * a bit of extra entropy and further randomizing the result, and comes * at almost no cost and with no real downside if the random source is * good. */ if (!s20Initialized) { s20Initialized = true; uint64_t s20Key[4]; s20Key[0] = (uint64_t)time(0); // system clock s20Key[1] = (uint64_t)buf; // address of buf s20Key[2] = (uint64_t)s20Key; // address of s20Key[] s20Key[3] = (uint64_t)&s20; // address of s20 s20.init(s20Key,s20Key); } #ifdef __WINDOWS__ static HCRYPTPROV cryptProvider = NULL; for(unsigned int i=0;i= sizeof(randomBuf)) { if (cryptProvider == NULL) { if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&cryptProvider,NULL,NULL,PROV_RSA_FULL,CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT|CRYPT_SILENT)) { fprintf(stderr,"FATAL ERROR: Utils::getSecureRandom() unable to obtain WinCrypt context!\r\n"); exit(1); } } if (!CryptGenRandom(cryptProvider,(DWORD)sizeof(randomBuf),(BYTE *)randomBuf)) { fprintf(stderr,"FATAL ERROR: Utils::getSecureRandom() CryptGenRandom failed!\r\n"); exit(1); } randomPtr = 0; s20.crypt12(randomBuf,randomBuf,sizeof(randomBuf)); s20.init(randomBuf,randomBuf); } ((uint8_t *)buf)[i] = randomBuf[randomPtr++]; } #else // not __WINDOWS__ static int devURandomFd = -1; if (devURandomFd < 0) { devURandomFd = ::open("/dev/urandom",O_RDONLY); if (devURandomFd < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"FATAL ERROR: Utils::getSecureRandom() unable to open /dev/urandom\n"); exit(1); return; } } for(unsigned int i=0;i= sizeof(randomBuf)) { for(;;) { if ((int)::read(devURandomFd,randomBuf,sizeof(randomBuf)) != (int)sizeof(randomBuf)) { ::close(devURandomFd); devURandomFd = ::open("/dev/urandom",O_RDONLY); if (devURandomFd < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"FATAL ERROR: Utils::getSecureRandom() unable to open /dev/urandom\n"); exit(1); return; } } else break; } randomPtr = 0; s20.crypt12(randomBuf,randomBuf,sizeof(randomBuf)); s20.init(randomBuf,randomBuf); } ((uint8_t *)buf)[i] = randomBuf[randomPtr++]; } #endif // __WINDOWS__ or not } } // namespace ZeroTier