Turns out we do want to propagate packets unauthenticated in the supernode case. This is fine.

This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2014-09-08 14:33:12 -04:00
parent b8729de9da
commit ea0f836ef1

View File

@ -610,13 +610,12 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doMULTICAST_FRAME(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const Shared
}
}
// Check the multicast frame's signature to verify that its original sender is
// who it claims to be.
if ((!network)||(network->authenticateMulticasts())) {
// Note that right now we authenticate multicasts if we aren't a member of a
// network... have to think about whether this is mandatory. It mostly only
// matters for supernodes though, since ordinary peers are unlikely ever to
// see multicasts for networks they don't belong to.
// Authenticate multicasts for networks that require this -- note that the only
// nodes that will ever see multicasts for networks they don't belong to are
// supernodes, and in this case not authenticating is not a big deal. When nodes
// that are members see packets with failed authentication they will drop them
// and they will no longer propagate.
if ((network)&&(network->authenticateMulticasts())) {
const unsigned int signedPartLen = (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_FRAME - ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX__START_OF_SIGNED_PORTION) + frameLen;
if (!originPeer->identity().verify(field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX__START_OF_SIGNED_PORTION,signedPartLen),signedPartLen,signature,signatureLen)) {
LOG("dropped MULTICAST_FRAME from %s(%s): failed signature verification, claims to be from %s",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),origin.toString().c_str());