Improve security posture by eliminating non-const data() accessor from Buffer.

This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2014-10-02 10:06:29 -07:00
parent e8c5495b61
commit e53d208ea4
5 changed files with 85 additions and 60 deletions

View File

@ -163,11 +163,13 @@ public:
return ((unsigned char *)_b)[i];
}
unsigned char *data() throw() { return (unsigned char *)_b; }
const unsigned char *data() const throw() { return (const unsigned char *)_b; }
/**
* Safe way to get a pointer to a field from data() with bounds checking
* Get a raw pointer to a field with bounds checking
*
* This isn't perfectly safe in that the caller could still overflow
* the pointer, but its use provides both a sanity check and
* documentation / reminder to the calling code to treat the returned
* pointer as being of size [l].
*
* @param i Index of field in buffer
* @param l Length of field in bytes
@ -304,8 +306,9 @@ public:
/**
* Increment size and return pointer to field of specified size
*
* The memory isn't actually written, so this is a shortcut for a multi-step
* process involving getting the current pointer and adding size.
* Nothing is actually written to the memory. This is a shortcut
* for addSize() followed by field() to reference the previous
* position and the new size.
*
* @param l Length of field to append
* @return Pointer to beginning of appended field of length 'l'
@ -352,6 +355,22 @@ public:
_l = i;
}
/**
* Move everything after 'at' to the buffer's front and truncate
*
* @param at Truncate before this position
* @throw std::out_of_range Position is beyond size of buffer
*/
inline void behead(const unsigned int at)
throw(std::out_of_range)
{
if (!at)
return;
if (at > _l)
throw std::out_of_range("Buffer: behead() beyond capacity");
::memmove(_b,_b + at,_l -= at);
}
/**
* Set buffer data length to zero
*/
@ -388,6 +407,11 @@ public:
Utils::burn(_b,sizeof(_b));
}
/**
* @return Constant pointer to data in buffer
*/
inline const void *data() const throw() { return _b; }
/**
* @return Size of data in buffer
*/

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@ -46,50 +46,56 @@ namespace ZeroTier {
bool IncomingPacket::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR)
{
if ((!encrypted())&&(verb() == Packet::VERB_HELLO)) {
// Unencrypted HELLOs are handled here since they are used to
// populate our identity cache in the first place. _doHELLO() is special
// in that it contains its own authentication logic.
//TRACE("<< HELLO from %s(%s) (normal unencrypted HELLO)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
return _doHELLO(RR);
}
SharedPtr<Peer> peer = RR->topology->getPeer(source());
if (peer) {
if (!dearmor(peer->key())) {
TRACE("dropped packet from %s(%s), MAC authentication failed (size: %u)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),size());
return true;
}
if (!uncompress()) {
TRACE("dropped packet from %s(%s), compressed data invalid",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
return true;
try {
if ((!encrypted())&&(verb() == Packet::VERB_HELLO)) {
// Unencrypted HELLOs are handled here since they are used to
// populate our identity cache in the first place. _doHELLO() is special
// in that it contains its own authentication logic.
return _doHELLO(RR);
}
//TRACE("<< %s from %s(%s)",Packet::verbString(verb()),source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
switch(verb()) {
//case Packet::VERB_NOP:
default: // ignore unknown verbs, but if they pass auth check they are still valid
peer->receive(RR,_fromSock,_remoteAddress,hops(),packetId(),verb(),0,Packet::VERB_NOP,Utils::now());
SharedPtr<Peer> peer = RR->topology->getPeer(source());
if (peer) {
if (!dearmor(peer->key())) {
TRACE("dropped packet from %s(%s), MAC authentication failed (size: %u)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),size());
return true;
case Packet::VERB_HELLO: return _doHELLO(RR);
case Packet::VERB_ERROR: return _doERROR(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_OK: return _doOK(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_WHOIS: return _doWHOIS(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_RENDEZVOUS: return _doRENDEZVOUS(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_FRAME: return _doFRAME(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_EXT_FRAME: return _doEXT_FRAME(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_P5_MULTICAST_FRAME: return _doP5_MULTICAST_FRAME(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_LIKE: return _doMULTICAST_LIKE(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_NETWORK_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE: return _doNETWORK_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST: return _doNETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH: return _doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER: return _doMULTICAST_GATHER(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME: return _doMULTICAST_FRAME(RR,peer);
}
if (!uncompress()) {
TRACE("dropped packet from %s(%s), compressed data invalid",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
return true;
}
//TRACE("<< %s from %s(%s)",Packet::verbString(verb()),source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
switch(verb()) {
//case Packet::VERB_NOP:
default: // ignore unknown verbs, but if they pass auth check they are "received"
peer->receive(RR,_fromSock,_remoteAddress,hops(),packetId(),verb(),0,Packet::VERB_NOP,Utils::now());
return true;
case Packet::VERB_HELLO: return _doHELLO(RR);
case Packet::VERB_ERROR: return _doERROR(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_OK: return _doOK(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_WHOIS: return _doWHOIS(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_RENDEZVOUS: return _doRENDEZVOUS(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_FRAME: return _doFRAME(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_EXT_FRAME: return _doEXT_FRAME(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_P5_MULTICAST_FRAME: return _doP5_MULTICAST_FRAME(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_LIKE: return _doMULTICAST_LIKE(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_NETWORK_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE: return _doNETWORK_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST: return _doNETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH: return _doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER: return _doMULTICAST_GATHER(RR,peer);
case Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME: return _doMULTICAST_FRAME(RR,peer);
}
} else {
RR->sw->requestWhois(source());
return false;
}
} else {
RR->sw->requestWhois(source());
return false;
} catch ( ... ) {
// Exceptions are more informatively caught in _do...() handlers but
// this outer try/catch will catch anything else odd.
TRACE("dropped ??? from %s(%s): unexpected exception in tryDecode()",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
return true;
}
}
@ -430,7 +436,8 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doFRAME(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
return true;
}
network->tapPut(MAC(peer->address(),network->id()),network->mac(),etherType,data() + ZT_PROTO_VERB_FRAME_IDX_PAYLOAD,size() - ZT_PROTO_VERB_FRAME_IDX_PAYLOAD);
unsigned int payloadLen = size() - ZT_PROTO_VERB_FRAME_IDX_PAYLOAD;
network->tapPut(MAC(peer->address(),network->id()),network->mac(),etherType,field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_FRAME_IDX_PAYLOAD,payloadLen),payloadLen);
}
peer->receive(RR,_fromSock,_remoteAddress,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_FRAME,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,Utils::now());

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@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ void Network::_restoreState()
}
}
// Read most recent multicast cert dump
// Read most recent membership cert dump
if ((_config)&&(!_config->isPublic())&&(Utils::fileExists(mcdbPath.c_str()))) {
CertificateOfMembership com;
Mutex::Lock _l(_lock);
@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ void Network::_restoreState()
if ((fread(magic,6,1,mcdb) == 1)&&(!memcmp("ZTMCD0",magic,6))) {
long rlen = 0;
do {
long rlen = (long)fread(buf.data() + buf.size(),1,ZT_NETWORK_CERT_WRITE_BUF_SIZE - buf.size(),mcdb);
long rlen = (long)fread(const_cast<char *>(static_cast<const char *>(buf.data())) + buf.size(),1,ZT_NETWORK_CERT_WRITE_BUF_SIZE - buf.size(),mcdb);
if (rlen < 0) rlen = 0;
buf.setSize(buf.size() + (unsigned int)rlen);
unsigned int ptr = 0;
@ -528,10 +528,7 @@ void Network::_restoreState()
if (com.issuedTo())
_membershipCertificates[com.issuedTo()] = com;
}
if (ptr) {
memmove(buf.data(),buf.data() + ptr,buf.size() - ptr);
buf.setSize(buf.size() - ptr);
}
buf.behead(ptr);
} while (rlen > 0);
fclose(mcdb);
} else {

View File

@ -383,13 +383,13 @@ public:
setSize(fragLen + ZT_PROTO_MIN_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
// NOTE: this copies both the IV/packet ID and the destination address.
memcpy(field(ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PACKET_ID,13),p.data() + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV,13);
memcpy(field(ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PACKET_ID,13),field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV,13),13);
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_FRAGMENT_INDICATOR] = ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_INDICATOR;
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_FRAGMENT_NO] = (char)(((fragTotal & 0xf) << 4) | (fragNo & 0xf));
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_HOPS] = 0;
memcpy(field(ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD,fragLen),p.data() + fragStart,fragLen);
memcpy(field(ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD,fragLen),field(fragStart,fragLen),fragLen);
}
/**

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@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ void Topology::_loadPeers()
if ((fread(magic,5,1,pd) == 1)&&(!memcmp("ZTPD0",magic,5))) {
long rlen = 0;
do {
long rlen = (long)fread(buf.data() + buf.size(),1,ZT_PEER_WRITE_BUF_SIZE - buf.size(),pd);
long rlen = (long)fread(const_cast<char *>(static_cast<const char *>(buf.data())) + buf.size(),1,ZT_PEER_WRITE_BUF_SIZE - buf.size(),pd);
if (rlen < 0) rlen = 0;
buf.setSize(buf.size() + (unsigned int)rlen);
unsigned int ptr = 0;
@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void Topology::_loadPeers()
_activePeers[p->address()] = p;
saveIdentity(p->identity());
}
if (ptr) {
memmove(buf.data(),buf.data() + ptr,buf.size() - ptr);
buf.setSize(buf.size() - ptr);
}
buf.behead(ptr);
} while (rlen > 0);
}
} catch ( ... ) {