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release notes, and delete MANUAL from this repo for now since it isn't quite done and will take shape on the web site

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ZeroTier Release Notes
======
*As of 1.2.0 this will serve as a detailed changelog, which we've needed for a long time.*
# 2017-03-13 -- Version 1.2.0
Version 1.2.0 is a major milestone release and introduces a large number of new capabilities to the ZeroTier core network hypervisor. It also includes some security tightening, major UI improvements for Windows and Macintosh platforms, and a number of bug fixes and platform issue workarounds.
## Features in 1.2.0
### The ZeroTier Rules Engine
The largest new feature in 1.2.0, and the product of many months of work, is our advanced network rules engine. With this release we achieve traffic control, security monitoring, and micro-segmentation capability on par with many enterprise SDN solutions designed for use in advanced data centers and corporate networks.
Rules allow you to filter packets on your network and vector traffic to security observers (e.g. a node running Snort). Security observation can be performed in-band using REDIRECT or out of band using TEE, and for tha latter it can be done for headers only, for select traffic, or probabilistically to reduce overhead on large distributed networks.
Tags and capabilites provide advanced methods for implementing fine grained permission structures and micro-segmentation schemes without bloating the size and complexity of your rules table.
See our manual for more information.
### Root Server Federation
It's now possible to create your own root servers and add them to the root server pool on your nodes. This is done by creating what's called a "moon," which is a signed enumeration of root servers and their stable points on the network. Refer to the manual for more details on how to do this and how it works.
Federated roots achieve a number of things:
* You can deploy your own infrastructure to reduce dependency on ours.
* You can deploy them *inside your LAN* to ensure that network connectivity inside your facility still works if the Internet goes down. This is the first step toward making ZeroTier viable as an in-house SDN solution.
* Roots can be deployed inside national boundaries for countries with data residency laws or "great firewalls." (As of 1.2.0 there is still no way to force all traffic to use these roots, but that will be easy to do in a later version.)
* Last but not least this makes ZeroTier somewhat less centralized by eliminating any hard dependency on ZeroTier, Inc.'s infrastructure.
Our roots will of course remain and continue to provide zero-configuration instant-on deployment, a secure global authority for identities, and free traffic relaying for those who can't establish peer to peer connections.
### Local Configuration
An element of our design philosophy is "features are bugs." This isn't an absolute dogma but more of a guiding principle. We try as hard as we can to avoid adding features, especially "knobs" that must be tweaked by a user.
As of 1.2.0 we've decided that certain knobs are unavoidable, and so there is now a `local.conf` file that can be used to configure them. See the ZeroTier One documentation for these. They include:
* Blacklisting interfaces you want to make sure ZeroTier doesn't use for network traffic, such as VPNs, slow links, or backplanes designated for only certain kinds of traffic.
* Turning uPnP/NAT-PMP on or off.
* Configuring software updates on Windows and Mac platforms.
* Defining trusted paths (the old trusted paths file is now deprecated)
* Setting the ZeroTier main port so it doesn't have to be changed on the command line, which is very inconvenient in many cases.
### Improved In-Band Software Updates
A good software update system for Windows and Mac clients has been a missing feature in previous versions. It does exist but we've been shy about using it so far due to its fragility in some environments.
We've greatly improved this mechanism in 1.2.0. Not only does it now do a better job of actually invoking the update, but it also transfers updates in-band using the ZeroTier protocol. This means it can work in environments that do not allows http/https traffic or that force it through proxies. There's also now an update channel setting: `beta` or `release` (the default).
As before software updates are authenticated in two ways:
1. ZeroTier's own signing key is used to sign all updates and this signature is checked prior to installation. Our signatures are done on an air-gapped machine.
2. Updates for Mac and Windows are signed using Apple and Microsoft (DigiCert) keys and will not install unless these signatures are also valid.
Version 1.2.0's in-band mechanism effectively adds a third way: updates are fetched in-band from a designated ZeroTier node, thus authenticating the source using ZeroTier's built-in encryption and authentication mechanisms.
Updates are now configurable via `local.conf`. There are three options: `disable`, `download`, and `apply`. The third is the default for official builds on Windows and Mac, making updates happen silently and automatically as they do for popular browsers like Chrome and Firefox. For managed enterprise deployments IT people could ship a local.conf that disables updates and instead push updates via their management capabilities. Updates are disabled on Linux and other Unix-type platforms as these get updates through package repositories.
### Path Quality Monitoring (QoS and SD-WAN phase one)
Version 1.2.0 is now aware of the link quality of direct paths with other 1.2.0 nodes. This information isn't used yet but is visible through the JSON API. (Quality always shows as 100% with pre-1.2.0 nodes.)
Link quality monitoring is a precursor to intelligent multi-path and QoS support, which will in future versions bring us to feature parity with SD-WAN products like Cisco iWAN.
"Connect all the things!"
### Security Improvements
Version 1.2.0 adds anti-DOS (denial of service) rate limits and other hardening for improved resiliency against a number of denial of service attack scenarios.
It also adds a mechanism for instantaneous credential revocation. This can be used to revoke certificates of membership instantly to kick a node off a network (for private networks) and also to revoke capabilities and tags. The new controller sends revocations by default when a peer is de-authorized.
Revocations propagate using a "rumor mill" peer to peer algorithm. This means that a controller need only successfully send a revocation to at least one member of a network with connections to other active members. At this point the revocation will flood through the network peer to peer very quickly. This helps make revocations more robust in the face of poor connectivity with the controller or attempts to incapacitate the controller with denial of service attacks, as well as making revocations faster on huge networks.
### Windows and Macintosh UI Improvements (ZeroTier One)
The Mac has a whole new UI built natively in Objective-C. It provides a pulldown similar in appearance and operation to the Mac WiFi task bar menu. The Windows UI has also been improved and now provides a task bar icon that can be right-clicked to manage networks. Both now expose managed route and IP permissions, allowing nodes to easily opt in to full tunnel operation if you have a router configured on your network.
## Major Bug Fixes in 1.2.0
* **The Windows HyperV 100% CPU bug**
* This long-running problem turns out to have been an issue with Windows itself, but one we were triggering by placing invalid data into the Windows registry. Microsoft is aware of the issue but we've also fixed the triggering problem on our side. ZeroTier should now co-exist quite well with HyperV and should now be able to be bridged with a HyperV virtual switch.
* **Segmenation Faults on musl-libc based Linux Systems**
* Alpine Linux and some embedded Linux systems that use musl libc (a minimal libc) experienced segmentation faults. These were due to a smaller default stack size. A work-around that sets the stack size for new threads has been added.
* **Windows Firewall Blocks Local JSON API**
* On some Windows systems the firewall likes to block 127.0.0.1:9993 for mysterious reasons. This is now fixed in the installer via the addition of another firewall exemption rule.
* **UI Crash on Embedded Windows Due to Missing Fonts**
* The MSI installer now ships fonts and will install them if they are not present, so this should be fixed.

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ZeroTier Manual
======
## **1.** Introduction <a name="1"></a>
ZeroTier is a smart Ethernet switch for planet Earth.
It's a distributed network hypervisor built atop a cryptographically secure global peer to peer network that provides capabilities similar to an enterprise smart switch such as VLANs, rules, device authentication, and security monitoring.
This manual describes the design and operation of ZeroTier and its associated services, apps, and libraries. Its intended audience includes IT professionals, network administrators, information security experts, and developers.
The first section (2) of this guide explains ZeroTier's design and operation at a high level and is written for those with at least an intermediate knowledge of topics like TCP/IP and Ethernet networking. It's not required reading for most users, but understanding how things work in detail helps clarify everything else and helps tremendously with troubleshooting should anything go wrong.
The remaining sections deal more concretely with deployment and administration.
### Table of Contents
1. [Introduction](#1)
2. [Network Hypervisor Overview](#2)
1. [VL1: The ZeroTier Peer to Peer Network](#2_1)
1. [Network Topology and Peer Discovery](#2_1_1)
2. [Addressing](#2_1_2)
3. [Cryptography](#2_1_3)
4. [Trusted Paths for Fast Local SDN](#2_1_4)
2. [VL2: The Ethernet Virtualization Layer](#2_2)
1. [Network Identifiers and Controllers](#2_2_1)
2. [Certificates and Other Credentials](#2_2_2)
3. [Multicast, ARP, NDP, and Special Addressing Modes](#2_2_3)
4. [Ethernet Bridging](#2_2_4)
5. [Public Networks](#2_2_5)
6. [Ad-Hoc Networks](#2_2_6)
3. [The Network Rules Engine](#3)
1. [Rule Sets and Rule Evaluation](#3_1)
2. [Capabilities](#3_2)
3. [Tags](#3_3)
4. [Rule Description Language](#3_4)
1. [Syntax](#3_4_1)
2. [Actions](#3_4_2)
3. [Match Conditions](#3_4_3)
4. [Capabilities](#3_4_4)
5. [Tags](#3_4_5)
6. [Macros](#3_4_6)
5. [Design Patterns](#3_5)
1. [TCP Whitelisting](#3_5_1)
2. [Low-Overhead Network Monitoring](#3_5_2)
------
## **2.** Network Hypervisor Overview <a name="2"></a>
The ZeroTier network hypervisor (currently found in the [node/](https://github.com/zerotier/ZeroTierOne/tree/master/node) subfolder of the ZeroTierOne git repository) is a self-contained network virtualization engine that implements an Ethernet virtualization layer similar to [VXLAN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_Extensible_LAN) on top of a global encrypted peer to peer network.
The ZeroTier protocol is original, though aspects of it are similar to VXLAN and IPSec. It has two conceptually separate but closely coupled layers [in the OSI model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model) sense: **VL1** and **VL2**. VL1 is the underlying peer to peer transport layer, the "virtual wire," while VL2 is an emulated Ethernet layer that provides operating systems and apps with a familiar communication medium.
### **2.1.** VL1: The ZeroTier Peer to Peer Network <a name="2_1"></a>
A global data center requires a global wire closet.
In conventional networks L1 (OSI layer 1) refers to the actual CAT5/CAT6 cables or wireless radio channels over which data is carried and the physical transciever chips that modulate and demodulate it. VL1 is a peer to peer network that does the same thing by using encryption, authentication, and a lot of networking tricks to create virtual wires on a dyniamic as-needed basis.
### **2.1.1.** Network Topology and Peer Discovery <a name="2_1_1"></a>
VL1 is designed to be zero-configuration. A user can start a new ZeroTier node without having to write configuration files or provide the IP addresses of other nodes. It's also designed to be fast. Any two devices in the world should be able to locate each other and communicate almost instantly.
To achieve this VL1 is organized like DNS. At the base of the network is a collection of always-present **root servers** whose role is similar to that of [DNS root name servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_name_server). Roots run the same software as regular endpoints but reside at fast stable locations on the network and are designated as such by a **world definition**. World definitions come in two forms: the **planet** and one or more **moons**. The protocol includes a secure mechanism allowing world definitions to be updated in-band if root servers' IP addresses or ZeroTier addresses change.
There is only one planet. Earth's root servers are operated by ZeroTier, Inc. as a free service. There are currently twelve root servers organized into two six-member clusters distributed across every major continent and multiple network providers. Almost everyone in the world has one within less than 100ms network latency from their location.
A node can "orbit" any number of moons. A moon is just a convenient way to add user-defined root servers to the pool. Users can create moons to reduce dependency on ZeroTier, Inc. infrastructure or to locate root servers closer for better performance. For on-premise SDN use a cluster of root servers can be located inside a building or data center so that ZeroTier can continue to operate normally if Internet connectivity is lost.
Nodes start with no direct links to one another, only upstream to roots (planet and moons). Every peer on VL1 possesses a globally unique 40-bit (10 hex digit) **ZeroTier address**, but unlike IP addresses these are opaque cryptographic identifiers that encode no routing information. To communicate peers first send packets "up" the tree, and as these packets traverse the network they trigger the opportunistic creation of direct links along the way. The tree is constantly trying to "collapse itself" to optimize itself to the pattern of traffic it is carrying.
Peer to peer connection setup goes like this:
1. A wants to send a packet to B, but since it has no direct path it sends it upstream to R (a root).
2. If R has a direct link to B, it forwards the packet there. Otherwise it sends the packet upstream until planetary roots are reached. Planetary roots know about all nodes, so eventually the packet will reach B if B is online.
3. R also sends a message called *rendezvous* to A containing hints about how it might reach B. Meanwhile the root that forwards the packet to B sends *rendezvous* informing B how it might reach A.
4. A and B get their *rendezvous* messages and attempt to send test messages to each other, possibly accomplishing [hole punching](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UDP_hole_punching) of any NATs or stateful firewalls that happen to be in the way. If this works a direct link is established and packets no longer need to take the scenic route.
Since roots forward packets, A and B can reach each other instantly. A and B then begin attempting to make a direct peer to peer connection. If this succeeds it results in a faster lower latency link. We call this *transport triggered link provisioning* since it's the forwarding of the packet itself that triggers the peer to peer network to attempt direct connection.
VL1 never gives up. If a direct path can't be established, communication can continue through (slower) relaying. Direct connection attempts continue forever on a periodic basis. VL1 also has other features for establishing direct connectivity including LAN peer discovery, port prediction for traversal of symmetric IPv4 NATs, and explicit port mapping using uPnP and/or NAT-PMP if these are available on the local physical LAN.
*[A blog post from 2014 by ZeroTier's original author explains some of the reasoning behind VL1's design.](http://adamierymenko.com/decentralization-i-want-to-believe/)*
### **2.1.2.** Addressing <a name="2_1_2"></a>
Every node is uniquely identified on VL1 by a 40-bit (10 hex digit) **ZeroTier address**. This address is computed from the public portion of a public/private key pair. A node's address, public key, and private key together form its **identity**.
*On devices running ZeroTier One the node identity is stored in `identity.public` and `identity.secret` in the service's home directory.*
When ZeroTier starts for the first time it generates a new identity. It then attempts to advertise it upstream to the network. In the very unlikely event that the identity's 40-bit unique address is taken, it discards it and generates another.
Identities are claimed on a first come first serve basis and currently expire from planetary roots after 60 days of inactivity. If a long-dormant device returns it may re-claim its identity unless its address has been taken in the meantime (again, highly unlikely).
The address derivation algorithm used to compute addresses from public keys imposes a computational cost barrier against the intentional generation of a collision. Currently it would take approximately 10,000 CPU-years to do so (assuming e.g. a 3ghz Intel core). This is expensive but not impossible, but it's only the first line of defense. After generating a collision an attacker would then have to compromise all upstream nodes, network controllers, and anything else that has recently communicated with the target node and replace their cached identities.
ZeroTier addresses are, once advertised and claimed, a very secure method of unique identification.
When a node attempts to send a message to another node whose identity is not cached, it sends a *whois* query upstream to a root. Roots provide an authoritative identity cache.
### **2.1.3.** Cryptography <a name="2_1_3"></a>
If you don't know much about cryptography you can safely skip this section. **TL;DR: packets are end-to-end encrypted and can't be read by roots or anyone else, and we use modern 256-bit crypto in ways recommended by the professional cryptographers that created it.**
Asymmetric public key encryption is [Curve25519/Ed25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519), a 256-bit elliptic curve variant.
Every VL1 packet is encrypted end to end using (as of the current version) 256-bit [Salsa20](https://ianix.com/pub/salsa20-deployment.html) and authenticated using the [Poly1305](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poly1305) message authentication (MAC) algorithm. MAC is computed after encryption [(encrypt-then-MAC)](https://tonyarcieri.com/all-the-crypto-code-youve-ever-written-is-probably-broken) and the cipher/MAC composition used is identical to the [NaCl reference implementation](https://nacl.cr.yp.to).
As of today we do not implement [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) or other stateful cryptographic features in VL1. We don't do this for the sake of simplicity, reliability, and code footprint, and because frequently changing state makes features like clustering and fail-over much harder to implement. See [our discussion on GitHub](https://github.com/zerotier/ZeroTierOne/issues/204).
We may implement forward secrecy in the future. For those who want this level of security today, we recommend using other cryptographic protocols such as SSL or SSH over ZeroTier. These protocols typically implement forward secrecy, but using them over ZeroTier also provides the secondary benefit of defense in depth. Most cryptography is compromised not by a flaw in encryption but through bugs in the implementation. If you're using two secure transports, the odds of a critical bug being discovered in both at the same time is very low. The CPU overhead of double-encryption is not significant for most work loads.
### **2.1.4.** Trusted Paths for Fast Local SDN <a name="2_1_4"></a>
To support the use of ZeroTier as a high performance SDN/NFV protocol over physically secure networks the protocol supports a feature called *trusted paths*. It is possible to configure all ZeroTier devices on a given network to skip encryption and authentication for traffic over a designated physical path. This can cut CPU use noticably in high traffic scenarios but at the cost of losing virtually all transport security.
Trusted paths do not prevent communication with devices elsewhere, since traffic over other paths will be encrypted and authenticated normally.
We don't recommend the use of this feature unless you really need the performance and you know what you're doing. We also recommend thinking carefully before disabling transport security on a cloud private network. Larger cloud providers such as Amazon and Azure tend to provide good network segregation but many less costly providers offer private networks that are "party lines" and are not much more secure than the open Internet.
### **2.2.** VL2: The Ethernet Virtualization Layer <a name="2_2"></a>
**VL2** is a [VXLAN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_Extensible_LAN)-like network virtualization protocol with SDN management features. It implements secure VLAN boundaries, multicast, rules, capability based security, and certificate based access control.
VL2 is built atop and carried by VL1, and in so doing it inherits VL1's encryption and endpoint authentication and can use VL1 asymmetric keys to sign and verify credentials. VL1 also allows us to implement VL2 entirely free of concern for underlying physical network topology. Connectivity and routing efficiency issues are VL1 concerns. It's important to understand that there is no relationship between VL2 virtual networks and VL1 paths. Much like VLAN multiplexing on a wired LAN, two nodes that share multiple network memberships in common will still only have one VL1 path (virtual wire) between them.
### **2.2.1.** Network Identifiers and Controllers <a name="2_2_1"></a>
Each VL2 network (VLAN) is identified by a 64-bit (16 hex digit) **ZeroTier network ID** that contains the 40-bit ZeroTier address of the network's **controller** and a 24-bit number identifying the network on the controller.
Network ID: 8056c2e21c123456
| |
| Network number on controller
|
ZeroTier address of controller
When a node joins a network or requests a network configuration update, it sends a network config query message (via VL1) to the network's controller. The controller can then use the node's VL1 address to look it up on the network and send it the appropriate certificates, credentials, and configuration information. From the perpsective of VL2 virtual networks, VL1 ZeroTier addresses can be thought of as port numbers on an enormous global-scale virtual switch.
A common misunderstanding is to conflate network controllers with root servers (planet and moons). Root servers are connection facilitators that operate at the VL1 level. Network controllers are configuration managers and certificate authorities that belong to VL2. Generally root servers don't join or control virtual networks and network controllers are not root servers, though it is possible to have a node do both.
#### Controller Security Considerations
Network controllers serve as certificate authorities for ZeroTier virtual networks. As such, their `identity.secret` files should be guarded closely and backed up securely. Compromise of a controller's secret key would allow an attacker to issue fraudulent network configurations or admit unauthorized members, while loss of the secret key results in loss of ability to control the network in any way or issue configuration updates and effectively renders the network unusable.
It is important that controllers' system clocks remain relatively accurate (to within 30-60 seconds) and that they are secure against remote tampering. Many cloud providers provide secure time sources either directly via the hypervisor or via NTP servers within their networks.
### **2.2.2.** Certificates and Other Credentials <a name="2_2_2"></a>
All credentials issued by network controllers to member nodes in a given network are signed by the controller's secret key to allow all network members to verify them. Credentials have timestamp fields populated by the controller, allowing relative comparison without the need to trust the node's local system clock.
Credentials are issued only to their owners and are then pushed peer to peer by nodes that wish to communicate with other nodes on the network. This allows networks to grow to enormous sizes without requiring nodes to cache large numbers of credentials or to constantly consult the controller.
#### Credential Types
* **Certificates of Membership**: a certificate that a node presents to obtain the right to communicate on a given network. Certificates of membership are accepted if they *agree*, meaning that the submitting member's certificate's timestamp differs from the recipient's certificate's timestamp by no more than the recipient certificate's maximum timestamp delta value. This creates a decentralized moving-window scheme for certificate expiration without requiring node clock synchronization or constant checking with the controller.
* **Revocations**: a revocation instantaneously revokes a given credential by setting a hard timestamp limit before which it will not be accepted. Revocations are rapidly propagated peer to peer among members of a network using a rumor mill algorithm, allowing a controller to revoke a member credential across the entire network even if its connection to some members is unreliable.
* **Capabilities**: a capability is a bundle of network rules that is signed by the controller and can be presented to other members of a network to grant the presenter elevated privileges within the framework of the network's base rule set. More on this in the section on rules.
* **Tags**: a tag is a key/value pair signed by the controller that is automatically presented by members to one another and can be matched on in base or capability network rules. Tags can be used to categorize members by role, department, classification, etc.
* **Certificates of Ownership**: these certify that a given network member owns something, such as an IP address. These are currently only used to lock down networks against IP address spoofing but could be used in the future to certify ownership of other network-level entities that can be matched in a filter.
### **2.2.3.** Multicast, ARP, NDP, and Special Addressing Modes <a name="2_2_3"></a>
ZeroTier networks support multicast via a simple publish/subscribe system.
When a node wishes to receive multicasts for a given multicast group, it advertises membership in this group to other members of the network with which it is communicating and to the network controller. When a node wishes to send a multicast it both consults its cache of recent advertisements and periodically solicits additional advertisements.
Broadcast (Ethernet *ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff*) is treated as a multicast group to which all members subscribe. It can be disabled at the network level to reduce traffic if it is not needed. IPv4 ARP receives special handling (see below) and will still work if normal broadcast is disabled.
Multicasts are propagated using simple sender-side replication. This places the full outbound bandwidth load for multicast on the sender and minimizes multicast latency. Network configurations contain a network-wide **multicast limit** configurable at the network controller. This specifies the maximum number of other nodes to which any node will send a multicast. If the number of known recipients in a given multicast group exceeds the multicast limit, the sender chooses a random subset.
There is no global limit on multicast recipients, but setting the multicast limit very high on very large networks could result in significant bandwidth overhead.
#### Special Handling of IPv4 ARP Broadcasts
IPv4 [ARP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_Resolution_Protocol) is built on simple Ethernet broadcast and scales poorly on large or distributed networks. To improve ARP's scalability ZeroTier generates a unique multicast group for each IPv4 address detected on its system and then transparently intercepts ARP queries and sends them only to the correct group. This converts ARP into effectively a unicast or narrow multicast protocol (like IPv6 NDP) and allows IPv4 ARP to work reliably across wide area networks without excess bandwidth consumption. A similar strategy is implemented under the hood by a number of enterprise switches and WiFi routers designed for deployment on extremely large LANs. This ARP emulation mode is transparent to the OS and application layers, but it does mean that packet sniffers will not see all ARP queries on a virtual network the way they typically can on smaller wired LANs.
#### Multicast-Free IPv6 Addressing Modes
IPv6 uses a protocol called [NDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neighbor_Discovery_Protocol) in place of ARP. It is similar in role and design but uses narrow multicast in place of broadcast for superior scalability on large networks. This protocol nevertheless still imposes the latency of an additional multicast lookup whenever a new address is contacted. This can add hundreds of milliseconds over a wide area network, or more if latencies associated with pub/sub recipient lookup are significant.
IPv6 addresses are large enough to easily encode ZeroTier addresses. For faster operation and better scaling we've implemented several special IPv6 addressing modes that allow the local node to emulate NDP. These are ZeroTier's **rfc4193** and **6plane** IPv6 address assignment schemes. If these addressing schemes are enabled on a network, nodes locally intercept outbound NDP queries for matching addresses and then locally generate spoofed NDP replies.
Both modes dramatically reduce initial connection latency between network members. **6plane** additionally exploits NDP emulation to transparently assign an entire IPv6 /80 prefix to every node without requiring any node to possess additional routing table entries. This is designed for virtual machine and container hosts that wish to auto-assign IPv6 addresses to guests and is very useful on microservice architecture backplane networks.
Finally there is a security benefit to NDP emulation. ZeroTier addresses are cryptographically authenticated, and since Ethernet MAC addresses on networks are computed from ZeroTier addresses these are also secure. NDP emulated IPv6 addressing modes are therefore not vulnerable to NDP reply spoofing.
Normal non-NDP-emulated IPv6 addresses (including link-local addresses) can coexist with NDP-emulated addressing schemes. Any NDP queries that do not match NDP-emulated addresses are sent via normal multicast.
### **2.2.4.** Ethernet Bridging <a name="2_2_4"></a>
ZeroTier emulates a true Ethernet switch. This includes the ability to L2 bridge other Ethernet networks (wired LAN, WiFi, virtual backplanes, etc.) to virtual networks using conventional Ethernet bridging.
To act as a bridge a network member must be designated as such by the controller. This is for security reasons as normal network members are not permitted to send traffic from any origin other than their MAC address. Designated bridges also receive special treatment from the multicast algorithm, which more aggressively and directly queries them for group subscriptions and replicates all broadcast traffic and ARP requests to them. As a result bridge nodes experience a slightly higher amount of multicast bandwidth overhead.
Bridging has been tested extensively on Linux using the Linux kernel native bridge, which cleanly handles network MTU mismatch. There are third party reports of bridging working on other platforms. The details of setting up bridging, including how to selectively block traffic like DHCP that may not be wanted across the bridge, are beyond the scope of this manual.
### **2.2.5.** Public Networks <a name="2_2_5"></a>
It is possible to disable access control on a ZeroTier network. A public network's members do not check certificates of membership, and new members to a public network are automatically marked as authorized by their host controller. It is not possible to de-authorize a member from a public network.
Rules on the other hand *are* enforced, so it's possible to implement a special purpose public network that only allows access to a few things or that only allows a restricted subset of traffic.
Public networks are useful for testing and for peer to peer "party lines" for gaming, chat, and other applications. Participants in public networks are warned to pay special attention to security. If joining a public network be careful not to expose vulnerable services or accidentally share private files via open network shares or HTTP servers. Make sure your operating system, applications, and services are fully up to date.
ZeroTier, Inc. operates a public network called Earth (no relation to the root server planet definition of the same name) with the network ID `8056c2e21c000001`. Earth issues IPv4 addresses in the unused IPv4 space 28.0.0.0/7 and rfc4193 IPv6 addresses and allows multicast for service discovery. It's essentially a global LAN party. After joining Earth visit `http://earth.zerotier.net/` to get a page showing your Earth virtual IP address and Ethernet MAC address.
### **2.2.6.** Ad-Hoc Networks <a name="2_2_6"></a>
A special kind of public network called an ad-hoc network may be accessed by joining a network ID with the format:
ffSSSSEEEE000000
| | | |
| | | Reserved for future use, must be 0
| | End of port range (hex)
| Start of port range (hex)
Reserved ZeroTier address prefix indicating a controller-less network
Ad-hoc networks are public (no access control) networks that have no network controller. Instead their configuration and other credentials are generated locally. Ad-hoc networks permit only IPv6 UDP and TCP unicast traffic (no multicast or broadcast) using 6plane format NDP-emulated IPv6 addresses. In addition an ad-hoc network ID encodes an IP port range. UDP packets and TCP SYN (connection open) packets are only allowed to desintation ports within the encoded range.
For example `ff00160016000000` is an ad-hoc network allowing only SSH, while `ff0000ffff000000` is an ad-hoc network allowing any UDP or TCP port.
Keep in mind that these networks are public and anyone in the entire world can join them. Care must be taken to avoid exposing vulnerable services or sharing unwanted files or other resources.
## **3.** The Network Rules Engine <a name="3"></a>
Traffic on ZeroTier networks can be observed and controlled with a system of globally applied network rules. These are enforced in a distributed fashion by both the senders and the receivers of packets, meaning that to escape the rules engine a malicious attacker would need to compromise systems on both sides of the conversation.
The ZeroTier VL2 rules engine differs from most other firewalls and SDN rules engines in several ways. The most immediately relevant of these is that the ZeroTier rules engine is stateless, meaning it lacks connection tracking. This means that bidirectional whitelisting can't be accomplished by simply whitelisting reply packets to established connections. Instead some thought must be put into how to allow both sides of a desired flow. Rule patterns to achieve the most common desired objectives are included in this manual.
The decision to make our rules engine stateless was a design trade-off driven by several concerns. First we wanted to keep complexity, code footprint, and memory use very low to support small embedded devices. The second and more fundamental reason is that distributed stateful filtering requires distributed state synchronization. This would have added a large volume of additional sync traffic as well as introducing [inescapable](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAP_theorem) new sources of instablity and failure and a lot of surface area for security vulnerabilities.
While ZeroTier lacks state tracking, its rules engine includes something not found anywhere else in the enterprise networking space: [capability-based security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security) and device tagging. Capabilities and tags allow extremely complex micro-segmented network rule schemes to be implemented in a sane, conceptual way that is both easier for human beings to understand and more efficient for machines to handle.
This section assumes some level of familiarity with network rules as they're commonly used on firewalls and routers, etc. While the rules engine is part of VL2, it's been given its own section in this manual due to the depth and cross-cutting nature of the topic.
### **3.1.** Rule Sets and Rule Evaluation <a name="3_1"></a>
Rule sets are ordered lists of one or more rules, with each rule consisting of one or more **match** conditions followed by one **action**. As a rule set is evaluated, each match is tested in order and is then ANDed or ORed with the previous match result state. When an action is encountered it is taken if the result of the preceding matches is *true*. An action with no preceding matches is always taken. If no permissive actions are taken by any rule set the packet is discarded.
Here is a simple rule set that constrains Ethernet traffic on a network to only IPv4, ARP, or IPv6 as it would appear in the raw JSON format used by ZeroTier One's built-in network controller implementation. Don't worry if this seems verbose and difficult. We have a more human-friendly way of writing rule sets, but before we introduce it it's important to understand what is really happening.
[
{
"etherType": 2048,
"not": true,
"or": false,
"type": "MATCH_ETHERTYPE"
},
{
"etherType": 2054,
"not": true,
"or": false,
"type": "MATCH_ETHERTYPE"
},
{
"etherType": 34525,
"not": true,
"or": false,
"type": "MATCH_ETHERTYPE"
},
{
"type": "ACTION_DROP"
},
{
"type": "ACTION_ACCEPT"
}
]
This checks whether an Ethernet level packet is _not_ IPv4 (ethertype 2048) _and not_ IPv4 ARP (ethertype 2054) _and not_ IPv6 (ethertype 34525). If all three matches evaluate to true (meaning the ethertype is none of these) then the **drop** action is taken. Otherwise the **accept** action is taken.
Networks have one base rule set that is applied to all traffic. Its size is constrained to 1024 entries (each match or action is an entry). It should be used to set the overall policies for all members of the network, and for most common use cases it's all you'll need. For more complex scenarios, both capabilities and tags provide methods of both managing complexity and scaling the overall size of a network's rule system.
### **3.2.** Capabilities <a name="3_2"></a>
A capability is a small rule set that is bundled into a credential object, signed by the network controller, and issued to only those member(s) permitted to exercise it. When a member detects that outgoing traffic does not match the base rule set but is allowed by one of its capabilities, it periodically pushes the matching capability credential to the recipient ahead of the packet(s) in question. Peer to peer capability distribution is automatic and is triggered by capability match.
When the recipient receives the capability it authenticates it by checking its signature and timestamp and, provided the capability is valid, adds it to the set of capabilities to apply to incoming traffic from the capability's owner. The sender has effectively told the recipient "I can too send this packet! Teacher says so!"
Capabilities allow large systems of rules to be broken down into functional aspects and then distributed intelligently only to those members with a need to know. This avoids the bandwidth and storage overhead of distributing huge monolithic rule sets and organizes rules conceptually to make them easier for administrators to understand.
There are three terminating actions that can be taken in a rule set: **accept**, **break**, and **drop**. The accept action terminates rule evaluation and accepts the packet. The break action terminates the evaluation of the current rule set but permits the further evaluation of capabilities. The drop action terminates rule evaluation and drops the packet without checking capabilities in the base rule set, but is equivalent to break in capability rule sets. In most cases break should be used unless certain traffic must be absolutely prohibited under any circumstance.
In the simple base rule set example in section 3.1 the drop action is taken in the unapproved case. This means that ethernet whitelisting cannot be overridden by a capability. If we change `ACTION_DROP` in our example to `ACTION_BREAK`, then it becomes possible to issue the following capability:
[
{
"etherType": 2114,
"not": false,
"or": false,
"type": "MATCH_ETHERTYPE"
},
{
"type": "ACTION_ACCEPT"
}
]
Ethertype 2114 is [wake-on-LAN](https://wiki.wireshark.org/WakeOnLAN), a special packet that can cause some systems to wake from sleep mode. If we place the above tiny rule set into a capability and issue it to a device, this device *but no others* will now be permitted to send wake-on-LAN magic packets. (Wake-on-LAN requires hardware support so it would only work to target devices plugged into a physical network bridged to a ZeroTier network, but don't worry about that here. It's just an example of special traffic.)
Capability rule sets are limited to only 64 entries. The idea is to keep them small and simple. A capability should grant one thing or one small set of conceptually related things.
### **3.3.** Tags <a name="3_3"></a>
ZeroTier provides a second mechanism to control rule set complexity. Tags are 32-bit numeric key-value pair credentials that are issued to network members and signed by the controller. They are then distributed peer to peer on a need to know basis in a similar manner to capabilities.
Tags provide a way to conditionally drop or allow traffic between members by member classification. They allow very detailed network micro-segmentation by member role, permission, function, etc. without resulting in a combinatorial explosion in rules table size.
Let's say we want to permit traffic on TCP ports 139 and 445 (netbios/CIFS file sharing) only between systems that belong to the same department. Our company has 12,000 devices and 10 departments. Without tags this would require 144,000,000 rules, but with tags it can be accomplished by only a few.
First a tag is created to represent the department. Let's give it tag ID 100. Each member system receives the tag with a value from 1 to 10 indicating which department it belongs to. We can then add the following rules to our network's base rule set (or to a capability if so desired):
[
{
"type": "MATCH_IP_DEST_PORT_RANGE",
"not": false,
"or": false,
"start": 139,
"end": 139
},
{
"type": "MATCH_IP_DEST_PORT_RANGE",
"not": false,
"or": true,
"start": 445,
"end": 445
},
{
"type": "MATCH_IP_PROTOCOL",
"not": false,
"or": false,
"ipProtocol": 6
},
{
"type": "MATCH_TAGS_DIFFERENCE",
"not": false,
"or": false,
"id": 10,
"value": 0
},
{
"type": "ACTION_ACCEPT"
}
]
This tells members in our network to accept TCP packets on ports 139 or 445 if the difference between tags with tag ID 10 is zero, meaning they match. (If a member does not have a value for this tag, it does not match.) Now all members of the same department can access CIFS file shares, but CIFS sharing between departments could still be prohibited. (TCP whitelisting requires some additional rules due to the stateless nature of our rules engine. See the section below on rule design patterns.)
Tags can be compared on numeric value or as bit fields via several different bit mask operations allowing many different systems of member classification to be implemented.
### **3.4.** Rule Description Language <a name="3_4"></a>