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https://github.com/zerotier/ZeroTierOne.git
synced 2024-12-19 04:57:53 +00:00
Add a few more rate limit gates for anti-DOS hardening.
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@ -341,11 +341,6 @@
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*/
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#define ZT_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS_CUTOFF_TIME 60000
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/**
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* General rate limit for other kinds of rate-limited packets (HELLO, credential request, etc.) both inbound and outbound
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*/
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#define ZT_PEER_GENERAL_RATE_LIMIT 1000
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/**
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* Maximum number of direct path pushes within cutoff time
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*
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@ -355,6 +350,21 @@
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*/
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#define ZT_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS_CUTOFF_LIMIT 5
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/**
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* Time horizon for VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS cutoff
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*/
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#define ZT_PEER_CREDENTIALS_CUTOFF_TIME 60000
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/**
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* Maximum number of VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS within cutoff time
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*/
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#define ZT_PEER_CREDEITIALS_CUTOFF_LIMIT 15
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/**
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* General rate limit for other kinds of rate-limited packets (HELLO, credential request, etc.) both inbound and outbound
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*/
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#define ZT_PEER_GENERAL_RATE_LIMIT 1000
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/**
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* Maximum number of paths per IP scope (e.g. global, link-local) and family (e.g. v4/v6)
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*/
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@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doERROR(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
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switch(errorCode) {
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case Packet::ERROR_OBJ_NOT_FOUND:
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// Object not found, currently only meaningful from network controllers.
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if (inReVerb == Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST) {
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SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
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if ((network)&&(network->controller() == peer->address()))
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@ -141,6 +142,9 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doERROR(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
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break;
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case Packet::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION:
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// This can be sent in response to any operation, though right now we only
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// consider it meaningful from network controllers. This would indicate
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// that the queried node does not support acting as a controller.
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if (inReVerb == Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST) {
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SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
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if ((network)&&(network->controller() == peer->address()))
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@ -149,11 +153,18 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doERROR(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
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break;
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case Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION:
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// Roots are the only peers currently permitted to state authoritatively
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// that an identity has collided. When this occurs the node should be shut
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// down and a new identity created. The odds of this ever happening are
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// very low.
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if (RR->topology->isRoot(peer->identity()))
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RR->node->postEvent(ZT_EVENT_FATAL_ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION);
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break;
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case Packet::ERROR_NEED_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE: {
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// This error can be sent in response to any packet that fails network
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// authorization. We only listen to it if it's from a peer that has recently
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// been authorized on this network.
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SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
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if ((network)&&(network->recentlyAllowedOnNetwork(peer))) {
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const uint64_t now = RR->node->now();
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@ -168,12 +179,15 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doERROR(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
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} break;
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case Packet::ERROR_NETWORK_ACCESS_DENIED_: {
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// Network controller: network access denied.
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SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
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if ((network)&&(network->controller() == peer->address()))
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network->setAccessDenied();
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} break;
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case Packet::ERROR_UNWANTED_MULTICAST: {
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// Members of networks can use this error to indicate that they no longer
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// want to receive multicasts on a given channel.
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SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
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if ((network)&&(network->gate(peer,verb(),packetId()))) {
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MulticastGroup mg(MAC(field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD + 8,6),6),at<uint32_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD + 14));
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@ -301,6 +315,8 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const bool alreadyAut
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// VALID -- if we made it here, packet passed identity and authenticity checks!
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// Learn our external surface address from other peers to help us negotiate symmetric NATs
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// and detect changes to our global IP that can trigger path renegotiation.
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if ((externalSurfaceAddress)&&(hops() == 0))
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RR->sa->iam(id.address(),_path->localAddress(),_path->address(),externalSurfaceAddress,RR->topology->isUpstream(id),now);
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@ -370,6 +386,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doOK(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer> &p
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const Packet::Verb inReVerb = (Packet::Verb)(*this)[ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_IN_RE_VERB];
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const uint64_t inRePacketId = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_IN_RE_PACKET_ID);
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// Don't parse OK packets that are not in response to a packet ID we sent
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if (!RR->node->expectingReplyTo(inRePacketId)) {
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TRACE("%s(%s): OK(%s) DROPPED: not expecting reply to %.16llx",peer->address().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str(),Packet::verbString(inReVerb),packetId());
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return true;
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@ -711,6 +728,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_LIKE(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const Shared
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uint64_t authOnNetwork[256];
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unsigned int authOnNetworkCount = 0;
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SharedPtr<Network> network;
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bool trustEstablished = false;
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// Iterate through 18-byte network,MAC,ADI tuples
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for(unsigned int ptr=ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD;ptr<size();ptr+=18) {
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@ -726,7 +744,9 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_LIKE(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const Shared
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if (!auth) {
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if ((!network)||(network->id() != nwid))
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network = RR->node->network(nwid);
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if ( ((network)&&(network->gate(peer,verb(),packetId()))) || RR->mc->cacheAuthorized(peer->address(),nwid,now) ) {
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const bool authOnNet = ((network)&&(network->gate(peer,verb(),packetId())));
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trustEstablished |= authOnNet;
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if (authOnNet||RR->mc->cacheAuthorized(peer->address(),nwid,now)) {
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auth = true;
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if (authOnNetworkCount < 256) // sanity check, packets can't really be this big
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authOnNetwork[authOnNetworkCount++] = nwid;
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@ -739,7 +759,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_LIKE(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const Shared
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}
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}
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peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_LIKE,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,false);
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peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_LIKE,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,trustEstablished);
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} catch ( ... ) {
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TRACE("dropped MULTICAST_LIKE from %s(%s): unexpected exception",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
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}
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@ -749,9 +769,15 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_LIKE(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const Shared
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bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CREDENTIALS(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer> &peer)
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{
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try {
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if (!peer->rateGateCredentialsReceived(RR->node->now())) {
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TRACE("dropped NETWORK_CREDENTIALS from %s(%s): rate limit circuit breaker tripped",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
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return true;
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}
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CertificateOfMembership com;
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Capability cap;
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Tag tag;
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bool trustEstablished = false;
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unsigned int p = ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD;
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while ((p < size())&&((*this)[p])) {
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@ -759,8 +785,10 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CREDENTIALS(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const S
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if (com) {
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SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(com.networkId()));
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if (network) {
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if (network->addCredential(com) == 1)
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return false; // wait for WHOIS
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switch (network->addCredential(com)) {
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case 0: trustEstablished = true; break;
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case 1: return false; // wait for WHOIS
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}
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} else RR->mc->addCredential(com,false);
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}
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}
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@ -772,8 +800,10 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CREDENTIALS(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const S
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p += cap.deserialize(*this,p);
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SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(cap.networkId()));
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if (network) {
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if (network->addCredential(cap) == 1)
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return false; // wait for WHOIS
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switch (network->addCredential(cap)) {
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case 0: trustEstablished = true; break;
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case 1: return false; // wait for WHOIS
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}
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}
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}
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@ -782,13 +812,15 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CREDENTIALS(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const S
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p += tag.deserialize(*this,p);
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SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(tag.networkId()));
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if (network) {
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if (network->addCredential(tag) == 1)
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return false; // wait for WHOIS
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switch (network->addCredential(tag)) {
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case 0: trustEstablished = true; break;
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case 1: return false; // wait for WHOIS
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}
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}
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}
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}
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peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,false);
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peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,trustEstablished);
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} catch ( ... ) {
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TRACE("dropped NETWORK_CREDENTIALS from %s(%s): unexpected exception",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
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}
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@ -900,11 +932,13 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,cons
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{
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try {
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const uint64_t nwid = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD);
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bool trustEstablished = false;
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if (Network::controllerFor(nwid) == peer->address()) {
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SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(nwid));
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if (network) {
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network->requestConfiguration();
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trustEstablished = true;
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} else {
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TRACE("dropped NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH from %s(%s): not a member of %.16llx",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str(),nwid);
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peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,false);
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@ -919,7 +953,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,cons
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}
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}
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peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,false);
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peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,trustEstablished);
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} catch ( ... ) {
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TRACE("dropped NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH from %s(%s): unexpected exception",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
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}
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@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ Peer::Peer(const RuntimeEnvironment *renv,const Identity &myIdentity,const Ident
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_lastWhoisRequestReceived(0),
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_lastEchoRequestReceived(0),
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_lastComRequestReceived(0),
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_lastCredentialsReceived(0),
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RR(renv),
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_remoteClusterOptimal4(0),
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_vProto(0),
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@ -60,7 +61,8 @@ Peer::Peer(const RuntimeEnvironment *renv,const Identity &myIdentity,const Ident
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_id(peerIdentity),
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_numPaths(0),
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_latency(0),
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_directPathPushCutoffCount(0)
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_directPathPushCutoffCount(0),
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_credentialsCutoffCount(0)
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{
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memset(_remoteClusterOptimal6,0,sizeof(_remoteClusterOptimal6));
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if (!myIdentity.agree(peerIdentity,_key,ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH))
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@ -338,15 +338,7 @@ public:
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inline bool remoteVersionKnown() const throw() { return ((_vMajor > 0)||(_vMinor > 0)||(_vRevision > 0)); }
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/**
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* Update direct path push stats and return true if we should respond
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*
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* This is a circuit breaker to make VERB_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS not particularly
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* useful as a DDOS amplification attack vector. Otherwise a malicious peer
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* could send loads of these and cause others to bombard arbitrary IPs with
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* traffic.
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*
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* @param now Current time
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* @return True if we should respond
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* Rate limit gate for VERB_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS
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*/
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inline bool rateGatePushDirectPaths(const uint64_t now)
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{
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@ -357,6 +349,18 @@ public:
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return (_directPathPushCutoffCount < ZT_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS_CUTOFF_LIMIT);
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}
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/**
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* Rate limit gate for VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS
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*/
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inline bool rateGateCredentialsReceived(const uint64_t now)
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{
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if ((now - _lastCredentialsReceived) <= ZT_PEER_CREDENTIALS_CUTOFF_TIME)
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++_credentialsCutoffCount;
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else _credentialsCutoffCount = 0;
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_lastCredentialsReceived = now;
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return (_directPathPushCutoffCount < ZT_PEER_CREDEITIALS_CUTOFF_LIMIT);
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}
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/**
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* Rate limit gate for sending of ERROR_NEED_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE
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*/
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@ -465,6 +469,7 @@ private:
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uint64_t _lastWhoisRequestReceived;
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uint64_t _lastEchoRequestReceived;
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uint64_t _lastComRequestReceived;
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uint64_t _lastCredentialsReceived;
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const RuntimeEnvironment *RR;
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uint32_t _remoteClusterOptimal4;
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uint16_t _vProto;
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@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ private:
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unsigned int _numPaths;
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unsigned int _latency;
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unsigned int _directPathPushCutoffCount;
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unsigned int _credentialsCutoffCount;
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AtomicCounter __refCount;
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};
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