Add a few more rate limit gates for anti-DOS hardening.

This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2016-09-13 10:13:23 -07:00
parent ea1da3321a
commit cba37c6107
4 changed files with 77 additions and 25 deletions

View File

@ -341,11 +341,6 @@
*/
#define ZT_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS_CUTOFF_TIME 60000
/**
* General rate limit for other kinds of rate-limited packets (HELLO, credential request, etc.) both inbound and outbound
*/
#define ZT_PEER_GENERAL_RATE_LIMIT 1000
/**
* Maximum number of direct path pushes within cutoff time
*
@ -355,6 +350,21 @@
*/
#define ZT_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS_CUTOFF_LIMIT 5
/**
* Time horizon for VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS cutoff
*/
#define ZT_PEER_CREDENTIALS_CUTOFF_TIME 60000
/**
* Maximum number of VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS within cutoff time
*/
#define ZT_PEER_CREDEITIALS_CUTOFF_LIMIT 15
/**
* General rate limit for other kinds of rate-limited packets (HELLO, credential request, etc.) both inbound and outbound
*/
#define ZT_PEER_GENERAL_RATE_LIMIT 1000
/**
* Maximum number of paths per IP scope (e.g. global, link-local) and family (e.g. v4/v6)
*/

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@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doERROR(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
switch(errorCode) {
case Packet::ERROR_OBJ_NOT_FOUND:
// Object not found, currently only meaningful from network controllers.
if (inReVerb == Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST) {
SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
if ((network)&&(network->controller() == peer->address()))
@ -141,6 +142,9 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doERROR(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
break;
case Packet::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION:
// This can be sent in response to any operation, though right now we only
// consider it meaningful from network controllers. This would indicate
// that the queried node does not support acting as a controller.
if (inReVerb == Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST) {
SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
if ((network)&&(network->controller() == peer->address()))
@ -149,11 +153,18 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doERROR(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
break;
case Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION:
// Roots are the only peers currently permitted to state authoritatively
// that an identity has collided. When this occurs the node should be shut
// down and a new identity created. The odds of this ever happening are
// very low.
if (RR->topology->isRoot(peer->identity()))
RR->node->postEvent(ZT_EVENT_FATAL_ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION);
break;
case Packet::ERROR_NEED_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE: {
// This error can be sent in response to any packet that fails network
// authorization. We only listen to it if it's from a peer that has recently
// been authorized on this network.
SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
if ((network)&&(network->recentlyAllowedOnNetwork(peer))) {
const uint64_t now = RR->node->now();
@ -168,12 +179,15 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doERROR(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer>
} break;
case Packet::ERROR_NETWORK_ACCESS_DENIED_: {
// Network controller: network access denied.
SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
if ((network)&&(network->controller() == peer->address()))
network->setAccessDenied();
} break;
case Packet::ERROR_UNWANTED_MULTICAST: {
// Members of networks can use this error to indicate that they no longer
// want to receive multicasts on a given channel.
SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)));
if ((network)&&(network->gate(peer,verb(),packetId()))) {
MulticastGroup mg(MAC(field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD + 8,6),6),at<uint32_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD + 14));
@ -301,6 +315,8 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const bool alreadyAut
// VALID -- if we made it here, packet passed identity and authenticity checks!
// Learn our external surface address from other peers to help us negotiate symmetric NATs
// and detect changes to our global IP that can trigger path renegotiation.
if ((externalSurfaceAddress)&&(hops() == 0))
RR->sa->iam(id.address(),_path->localAddress(),_path->address(),externalSurfaceAddress,RR->topology->isUpstream(id),now);
@ -370,6 +386,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doOK(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer> &p
const Packet::Verb inReVerb = (Packet::Verb)(*this)[ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_IN_RE_VERB];
const uint64_t inRePacketId = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_IN_RE_PACKET_ID);
// Don't parse OK packets that are not in response to a packet ID we sent
if (!RR->node->expectingReplyTo(inRePacketId)) {
TRACE("%s(%s): OK(%s) DROPPED: not expecting reply to %.16llx",peer->address().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str(),Packet::verbString(inReVerb),packetId());
return true;
@ -711,6 +728,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_LIKE(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const Shared
uint64_t authOnNetwork[256];
unsigned int authOnNetworkCount = 0;
SharedPtr<Network> network;
bool trustEstablished = false;
// Iterate through 18-byte network,MAC,ADI tuples
for(unsigned int ptr=ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD;ptr<size();ptr+=18) {
@ -726,7 +744,9 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_LIKE(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const Shared
if (!auth) {
if ((!network)||(network->id() != nwid))
network = RR->node->network(nwid);
if ( ((network)&&(network->gate(peer,verb(),packetId()))) || RR->mc->cacheAuthorized(peer->address(),nwid,now) ) {
const bool authOnNet = ((network)&&(network->gate(peer,verb(),packetId())));
trustEstablished |= authOnNet;
if (authOnNet||RR->mc->cacheAuthorized(peer->address(),nwid,now)) {
auth = true;
if (authOnNetworkCount < 256) // sanity check, packets can't really be this big
authOnNetwork[authOnNetworkCount++] = nwid;
@ -739,7 +759,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_LIKE(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const Shared
}
}
peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_LIKE,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,false);
peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_MULTICAST_LIKE,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,trustEstablished);
} catch ( ... ) {
TRACE("dropped MULTICAST_LIKE from %s(%s): unexpected exception",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
}
@ -749,9 +769,15 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_LIKE(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const Shared
bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CREDENTIALS(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer> &peer)
{
try {
if (!peer->rateGateCredentialsReceived(RR->node->now())) {
TRACE("dropped NETWORK_CREDENTIALS from %s(%s): rate limit circuit breaker tripped",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
return true;
}
CertificateOfMembership com;
Capability cap;
Tag tag;
bool trustEstablished = false;
unsigned int p = ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD;
while ((p < size())&&((*this)[p])) {
@ -759,8 +785,10 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CREDENTIALS(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const S
if (com) {
SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(com.networkId()));
if (network) {
if (network->addCredential(com) == 1)
return false; // wait for WHOIS
switch (network->addCredential(com)) {
case 0: trustEstablished = true; break;
case 1: return false; // wait for WHOIS
}
} else RR->mc->addCredential(com,false);
}
}
@ -772,8 +800,10 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CREDENTIALS(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const S
p += cap.deserialize(*this,p);
SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(cap.networkId()));
if (network) {
if (network->addCredential(cap) == 1)
return false; // wait for WHOIS
switch (network->addCredential(cap)) {
case 0: trustEstablished = true; break;
case 1: return false; // wait for WHOIS
}
}
}
@ -782,13 +812,15 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CREDENTIALS(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const S
p += tag.deserialize(*this,p);
SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(tag.networkId()));
if (network) {
if (network->addCredential(tag) == 1)
return false; // wait for WHOIS
switch (network->addCredential(tag)) {
case 0: trustEstablished = true; break;
case 1: return false; // wait for WHOIS
}
}
}
}
peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,false);
peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,trustEstablished);
} catch ( ... ) {
TRACE("dropped NETWORK_CREDENTIALS from %s(%s): unexpected exception",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
}
@ -900,11 +932,13 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,cons
{
try {
const uint64_t nwid = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD);
bool trustEstablished = false;
if (Network::controllerFor(nwid) == peer->address()) {
SharedPtr<Network> network(RR->node->network(nwid));
if (network) {
network->requestConfiguration();
trustEstablished = true;
} else {
TRACE("dropped NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH from %s(%s): not a member of %.16llx",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str(),nwid);
peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,false);
@ -919,7 +953,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,cons
}
}
peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,false);
peer->received(_path,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,trustEstablished);
} catch ( ... ) {
TRACE("dropped NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH from %s(%s): unexpected exception",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
}

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@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ Peer::Peer(const RuntimeEnvironment *renv,const Identity &myIdentity,const Ident
_lastWhoisRequestReceived(0),
_lastEchoRequestReceived(0),
_lastComRequestReceived(0),
_lastCredentialsReceived(0),
RR(renv),
_remoteClusterOptimal4(0),
_vProto(0),
@ -60,7 +61,8 @@ Peer::Peer(const RuntimeEnvironment *renv,const Identity &myIdentity,const Ident
_id(peerIdentity),
_numPaths(0),
_latency(0),
_directPathPushCutoffCount(0)
_directPathPushCutoffCount(0),
_credentialsCutoffCount(0)
{
memset(_remoteClusterOptimal6,0,sizeof(_remoteClusterOptimal6));
if (!myIdentity.agree(peerIdentity,_key,ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH))

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@ -338,15 +338,7 @@ public:
inline bool remoteVersionKnown() const throw() { return ((_vMajor > 0)||(_vMinor > 0)||(_vRevision > 0)); }
/**
* Update direct path push stats and return true if we should respond
*
* This is a circuit breaker to make VERB_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS not particularly
* useful as a DDOS amplification attack vector. Otherwise a malicious peer
* could send loads of these and cause others to bombard arbitrary IPs with
* traffic.
*
* @param now Current time
* @return True if we should respond
* Rate limit gate for VERB_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS
*/
inline bool rateGatePushDirectPaths(const uint64_t now)
{
@ -357,6 +349,18 @@ public:
return (_directPathPushCutoffCount < ZT_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS_CUTOFF_LIMIT);
}
/**
* Rate limit gate for VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS
*/
inline bool rateGateCredentialsReceived(const uint64_t now)
{
if ((now - _lastCredentialsReceived) <= ZT_PEER_CREDENTIALS_CUTOFF_TIME)
++_credentialsCutoffCount;
else _credentialsCutoffCount = 0;
_lastCredentialsReceived = now;
return (_directPathPushCutoffCount < ZT_PEER_CREDEITIALS_CUTOFF_LIMIT);
}
/**
* Rate limit gate for sending of ERROR_NEED_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE
*/
@ -465,6 +469,7 @@ private:
uint64_t _lastWhoisRequestReceived;
uint64_t _lastEchoRequestReceived;
uint64_t _lastComRequestReceived;
uint64_t _lastCredentialsReceived;
const RuntimeEnvironment *RR;
uint32_t _remoteClusterOptimal4;
uint16_t _vProto;
@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ private:
unsigned int _numPaths;
unsigned int _latency;
unsigned int _directPathPushCutoffCount;
unsigned int _credentialsCutoffCount;
AtomicCounter __refCount;
};