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https://github.com/zerotier/ZeroTierOne.git
synced 2025-04-12 05:29:54 +00:00
Documentation improvements and some very minor pre-emptive security stuff.
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commit
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@ -35,6 +35,21 @@
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#include "Filter.hpp"
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#include "Service.hpp"
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/*
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* The big picture:
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*
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* tryDecode() gets called for a given fully-assembled packet until it returns
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* true or the packet's time to live has been exceeded. The state machine must
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* therefore be re-entrant if it ever returns false. Take care here!
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*
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* Stylistic note:
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*
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* There's a lot of unnecessary if nesting. It's mostly to allow TRACE to
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* print informative messages on every possible reason something gets
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* rejected or fails. Sometimes it also makes code more explicit and thus
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* easier to understand.
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*/
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namespace ZeroTier {
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bool PacketDecoder::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
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@ -50,14 +65,15 @@ bool PacketDecoder::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
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SharedPtr<Peer> peer = _r->topology->getPeer(source());
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if (peer) {
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if (_step == DECODE_STEP_WAITING_FOR_ORIGINAL_SUBMITTER_LOOKUP) {
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// This means we've already decoded, decrypted, decompressed, and
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// validated, and we're processing a MULTICAST_FRAME. We're waiting
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// for a lookup on the frame's original submitter. So try again and
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// see if we have it.
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// Resume saved state?
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if (_step == DECODE_WAITING_FOR_MULTICAST_FRAME_ORIGINAL_SENDER_LOOKUP) {
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// In this state we have already authenticated and decrypted the
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// packet and are waiting for the lookup of the original sender
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// for a multicast frame. So check to see if we've got it.
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return _doMULTICAST_FRAME(_r,peer);
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}
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// No saved state? Verify MAC before we proceed.
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if (!hmacVerify(peer->macKey())) {
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TRACE("dropped packet from %s(%s), HMAC authentication failed (size: %u)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),size());
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return true;
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@ -80,8 +96,9 @@ bool PacketDecoder::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
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Packet::Verb v = verb();
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// Validated packets that have passed HMAC can result in us learning a new
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// path to this peer.
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// Once a packet is determined to be basically valid, it can be used
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// to passively learn a new network path to the sending peer. It
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// also results in statistics updates.
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peer->onReceive(_r,_localPort,_remoteAddress,hops(),v,Utils::now());
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switch(v) {
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@ -89,7 +106,7 @@ bool PacketDecoder::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
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TRACE("NOP from %s(%s)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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return true;
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case Packet::VERB_HELLO:
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return _doHELLO(_r);
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return _doHELLO(_r); // encrypted HELLO is technically allowed, but kind of pointless... :)
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case Packet::VERB_ERROR:
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return _doERROR(_r,peer);
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case Packet::VERB_OK:
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@ -118,7 +135,7 @@ bool PacketDecoder::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
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return true;
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}
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} else {
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_step = DECODE_STEP_WAITING_FOR_SENDER_LOOKUP;
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_step = DECODE_WAITING_FOR_SENDER_LOOKUP; // should already be this...
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_r->sw->requestWhois(source());
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return false;
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}
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@ -213,27 +230,26 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
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uint64_t timestamp = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_TIMESTAMP);
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Identity id(*this,ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_IDENTITY);
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// Create a new candidate peer that we might decide to add to our
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// database. We create it now since we want its keys to send replies
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// even in the error case, and the code for keying is in Peer.
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SharedPtr<Peer> candidate(new Peer(_r->identity,id));
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candidate->setPathAddress(_remoteAddress,false);
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// Initial sniff test
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if (id.address().isReserved()) {
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TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): identity has reserved address",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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// The initial sniff test... is the identity valid, and is it
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// the sender's identity?
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if ((id.address().isReserved())||(id.address() != source())) {
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#ifdef ZT_TRACE
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if (id.address().isReserved()) {
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TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): identity has reserved address",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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} else {
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TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): identity is not for sender of packet (HELLO is a self-announcement)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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}
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#endif
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Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR);
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outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
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outp.append(packetId());
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outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_INVALID);
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outp.encrypt(candidate->cryptKey());
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outp.hmacSet(candidate->macKey());
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_r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1);
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return true;
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}
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if (id.address() != source()) {
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TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): identity is not for sender of packet (HELLO is a self-announcement)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR);
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outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
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outp.append(packetId());
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outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_INVALID_REQUEST);
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outp.append((unsigned char)((id.address().isReserved()) ? Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_INVALID : Packet::ERROR_INVALID_REQUEST));
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outp.encrypt(candidate->cryptKey());
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outp.hmacSet(candidate->macKey());
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_r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1);
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@ -257,7 +273,9 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
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return true;
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}
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// Otherwise we call addPeer() and set up a callback to handle the verdict
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// Otherwise we call addPeer() and set up a callback to handle the verdict.
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// Topology evaluates the peer in the background, possibly doing the entire
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// expensive analysis before determining whether to add it to the database.
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_CBaddPeerFromHello_Data *arg = new _CBaddPeerFromHello_Data;
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arg->renv = _r;
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arg->source = source();
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@ -288,19 +306,21 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doOK(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const SharedPtr<Peer> &pe
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TRACE("%s(%s): OK(HELLO), latency: %u",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),latency);
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peer->setLatency(_remoteAddress,latency);
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} break;
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case Packet::VERB_WHOIS:
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// Right now we only query supernodes for WHOIS and only accept
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// OK back from them. If we query other nodes, we'll have to
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// do something to prevent WHOIS cache poisoning such as
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// using the packet ID field in the OK packet to match with the
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// original query. Technically we should be doing this anyway.
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case Packet::VERB_WHOIS: {
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TRACE("%s(%s): OK(%s)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),Packet::verbString(inReVerb));
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if (_r->topology->isSupernode(source()))
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if (_r->topology->isSupernode(source())) {
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// Right now, only supernodes are queried for WHOIS so we only
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// accept OK(WHOIS) from supernodes. Otherwise peers could
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// potentially cache-poison. A more elegant but memory-intensive
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// solution would be to remember packet IDs of WHOIS requests.
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_r->topology->addPeer(SharedPtr<Peer>(new Peer(_r->identity,Identity(*this,ZT_PROTO_VERB_WHOIS__OK__IDX_IDENTITY))),&PacketDecoder::_CBaddPeerFromWhois,const_cast<void *>((const void *)_r));
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break;
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}
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} break;
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case Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST: {
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SharedPtr<Network> nw(_r->nc->network(at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_NETWORK_ID)));
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if ((nw)&&(nw->controller() == source())) {
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// Only accept OK(NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST) from masters for
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// networks we have.
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unsigned int dictlen = at<uint16_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_DICT_LEN);
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std::string dict((const char *)field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_DICT,dictlen),dictlen);
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if (dict.length()) {
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@ -357,20 +377,38 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doWHOIS(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const SharedPtr<Peer>
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bool PacketDecoder::_doRENDEZVOUS(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const SharedPtr<Peer> &peer)
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{
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try {
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Address with(field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ZTADDRESS,ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH),ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH);
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SharedPtr<Peer> withPeer(_r->topology->getPeer(with));
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if (withPeer) {
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unsigned int port = at<uint16_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_PORT);
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unsigned int addrlen = (*this)[ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ADDRLEN];
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if ((port > 0)&&((addrlen == 4)||(addrlen == 16))) {
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InetAddress atAddr(field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ADDRESS,addrlen),addrlen,port);
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TRACE("RENDEZVOUS from %s says %s might be at %s, starting NAT-t",source().toString().c_str(),with.toString().c_str(),atAddr.toString().c_str());
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_r->sw->contact(withPeer,atAddr);
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//
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// At the moment, we only obey RENDEZVOUS if it comes from a designated
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// supernode. If relay offloading is implemented to scale the net, this
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// will need reconsideration.
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//
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// The reason is that RENDEZVOUS could technically be used to cause a
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// peer to send a weird encrypted UDP packet to an arbitrary IP:port.
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// The sender of RENDEZVOUS has no control over the content of this
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// packet, but it's still maybe something we want to not allow just
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// anyone to order due to possible DDOS or network forensic implications.
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// So if we diversify relays, we'll need some way of deciding whether the
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// sender is someone we should trust with a RENDEZVOUS hint. Or maybe
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// we just need rate limiting to prevent DDOS and amplification attacks.
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//
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if (_r->topology->isSupernode(source())) {
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Address with(field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ZTADDRESS,ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH),ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH);
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SharedPtr<Peer> withPeer(_r->topology->getPeer(with));
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if (withPeer) {
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unsigned int port = at<uint16_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_PORT);
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unsigned int addrlen = (*this)[ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ADDRLEN];
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if ((port > 0)&&((addrlen == 4)||(addrlen == 16))) {
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InetAddress atAddr(field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ADDRESS,addrlen),addrlen,port);
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TRACE("RENDEZVOUS from %s says %s might be at %s, starting NAT-t",source().toString().c_str(),with.toString().c_str(),atAddr.toString().c_str());
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_r->sw->contact(withPeer,atAddr);
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} else {
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TRACE("dropped corrupt RENDEZVOUS from %s(%s) (bad address or port)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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}
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} else {
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TRACE("dropped corrupt RENDEZVOUS from %s(%s) (bad address or port)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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TRACE("ignored RENDEZVOUS from %s(%s) to meet unknown peer %s",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),with.toString().c_str());
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}
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} else {
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TRACE("ignored RENDEZVOUS from %s(%s) to meet unknown peer %s",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),with.toString().c_str());
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TRACE("ignored RENDEZVOUS from %s(%s): source not supernode",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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}
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} catch (std::exception &ex) {
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TRACE("dropped RENDEZVOUS from %s(%s): %s",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),ex.what());
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@ -487,7 +525,7 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doMULTICAST_FRAME(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const Shared
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if (!originalSubmitter) {
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TRACE("requesting WHOIS on original multicast frame submitter %s",originalSubmitterAddress.toString().c_str());
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_r->sw->requestWhois(originalSubmitterAddress);
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_step = DECODE_STEP_WAITING_FOR_ORIGINAL_SUBMITTER_LOOKUP;
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_step = DECODE_WAITING_FOR_MULTICAST_FRAME_ORIGINAL_SENDER_LOOKUP;
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return false; // try again if/when we get OK(WHOIS)
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} else if (Multicaster::verifyMulticastPacket(originalSubmitter->identity(),network->id(),fromMac,mg,etherType,dataAndSignature,datalen,dataAndSignature + datalen,signaturelen)) {
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_r->multicaster->addToDedupHistory(mccrc,now);
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@ -538,7 +576,7 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doMULTICAST_FRAME(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const Shared
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//TRACE("terminating MULTICAST_FRAME propagation from %s(%s): max depth reached",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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}
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} else {
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LOG("rejected MULTICAST_FRAME from %s(%s) due to failed signature check (claims original sender %s)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),originalSubmitterAddress.toString().c_str());
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LOG("rejected MULTICAST_FRAME from %s(%s) due to failed signature check (falsely claims origin %s)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),originalSubmitterAddress.toString().c_str());
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}
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} else {
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TRACE("dropped redundant MULTICAST_FRAME from %s(%s)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
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@ -575,9 +613,10 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doNETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const
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#ifndef __WINDOWS__
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if (_r->netconfService) {
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unsigned int dictLen = at<uint16_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST_IDX_DICT_LEN);
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std::string dict((const char *)field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST_IDX_DICT,dictLen),dictLen);
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Dictionary request;
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if (dictLen)
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request["meta"] = std::string((const char *)field(ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST_IDX_DICT,dictLen),dictLen);
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request["type"] = "netconf-request";
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request["peerId"] = peer->identity().toString(false);
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sprintf(tmp,"%llx",(unsigned long long)nwid);
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_receiveTime(Utils::now()),
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_localPort(localPort),
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_remoteAddress(remoteAddress),
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_step(DECODE_STEP_WAITING_FOR_SENDER_LOOKUP),
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_step(DECODE_WAITING_FOR_SENDER_LOOKUP),
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__refCount()
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{
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}
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@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ private:
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InetAddress _remoteAddress;
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enum {
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DECODE_STEP_WAITING_FOR_SENDER_LOOKUP, // on initial receipt, we need peer's identity
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DECODE_STEP_WAITING_FOR_ORIGINAL_SUBMITTER_LOOKUP // this only applies to MULTICAST_FRAME
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DECODE_WAITING_FOR_SENDER_LOOKUP, // on initial receipt, we need peer's identity
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DECODE_WAITING_FOR_MULTICAST_FRAME_ORIGINAL_SENDER_LOOKUP,
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} _step;
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AtomicCounter __refCount;
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