Some prep work to make room for perfect forward security (PFS). Will not affect existing clients.

This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2015-05-13 18:53:37 -07:00
parent bdce679d84
commit a8835cd8b3
2 changed files with 20 additions and 21 deletions

View File

@ -118,8 +118,6 @@ bool Packet::dearmor(const void *key)
s20.decrypt(payload,payload,payloadLen);
return true;
} else if (cs == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_AES256_GCM) {
return false; // not implemented yet
} else return false; // unrecognized cipher suite
}

View File

@ -99,14 +99,12 @@
#define ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_POLY1305_SALSA2012 1
/**
* Cipher suite: Curve25519/AES256-GCM
* DEPRECATED payload encrypted flag, will be removed for re-use soon.
*
* This specifies AES256 in GCM mode using GCM's built-in authentication
* with Curve25519 elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman.
*
* (Not implemented yet in client but reserved for future use.)
* This has been replaced by the two-bit cipher suite selection field where
* a value of 0 indicated unencrypted (but authenticated) messages.
*/
#define ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_AES256_GCM 2
#define ZT_PROTO_FLAG_ENCRYPTED 0x80
/**
* Header flag indicating that a packet is fragmented
@ -116,6 +114,13 @@
*/
#define ZT_PROTO_FLAG_FRAGMENTED 0x40
/**
* Flag indicating encryption with a PFS session key
*
* Not used yet -- for future PFS session re-keying support.
*/
#define ZT_PROTO_FLAG_PFS_SESSION 0x20
/**
* Verb flag indicating payload is compressed with LZ4
*/
@ -293,9 +298,9 @@ namespace ZeroTier {
*
* Packets smaller than 28 bytes are invalid and silently discarded.
*
* The flags/cipher/hops bit field is: FFCCCHHH where C is a 3-bit cipher
* selection allowing up to 8 cipher suites, F is flags (reserved, currently
* all zero), and H is hop count.
* The flags/cipher/hops bit field is: FFFCCHHH where C is a 2-bit cipher
* selection allowing up to 4 cipher suites, F is outside-envelope flags,
* and H is hop count.
*
* The three-bit hop count is the only part of a packet that is mutable in
* transit without invalidating the MAC. All other bits in the packet are
@ -968,25 +973,21 @@ public:
*/
inline unsigned int cipher() const
{
//return (((unsigned int)(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] & 0x38) >> 3);
// Use DEPRECATED 0x80 "encrypted" flag -- this will go away once there are no more <1.0.0 peers on the net
return (((*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] & 0x80) == 0) ? ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_POLY1305_NONE : ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_POLY1305_SALSA2012;
// Note: this uses the new cipher spec field, which is incompatible with <1.0.0 peers
return (((unsigned int)(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] & 0x18) >> 3);
}
/**
* Set this packet's cipher suite
*
* This normally shouldn't be called directly as armor() will set it after
* encrypting and MACing the packet.
*/
inline void setCipher(unsigned int c)
{
unsigned char &b = (*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS];
b = (b & 0xc7) | (unsigned char)((c << 3) & 0x38);
// Set both the new cipher suite spec field and the old DEPRECATED "encrypted" flag as long as there's <1.0.0 peers online
b = (b & 0xe7) | (unsigned char)((c << 3) & 0x18); // bits: FFFCCHHH
// DEPRECATED "encrypted" flag -- used by pre-1.0.3 peers
if (c == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_POLY1305_SALSA2012)
b |= 0x80;
else b &= 0x7f;
b |= ZT_PROTO_FLAG_ENCRYPTED;
else b &= (~ZT_PROTO_FLAG_ENCRYPTED);
}
/**