ZeroTierOne/osdep/LinuxDropPrivileges.cpp

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#include "LinuxDropPrivileges.hpp"
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
namespace ZeroTier {
#ifndef PR_CAP_AMBIENT
// if we are on old libc, dropPrivileges is nop
void dropPrivileges(std::string homeDir) {}
#else
const char* TARGET_USER_NAME = "zerotier-one";
struct cap_header_struct {
__u32 version;
int pid;
};
struct cap_data_struct {
__u32 effective;
__u32 permitted;
__u32 inheritable;
};
// libc doesn't export capset, it is instead located in libcap
// We ignore libcap and call it manually.
int capset(cap_header_struct* hdrp, cap_data_struct* datap) {
return syscall(SYS_capset, hdrp, datap);
}
void notDropping(std::string homeDir) {
struct stat buf;
if (lstat(homeDir.c_str(), &buf) < 0) {
if (buf.st_uid != 0 || buf.st_gid != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: failed to drop privileges. Refusing to run as root, because %s was already used in nonprivileged mode.\n", homeDir.c_str());
exit(1);
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: failed to drop privileges, running as root\n");
}
int setCapabilities(int flags) {
cap_header_struct capheader = {_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1, 0};
cap_data_struct capdata;
capdata.inheritable = capdata.permitted = capdata.effective = flags;
return capset(&capheader, &capdata);
}
void createOwnedHomedir(std::string homeDir, struct passwd* targetUser) {
struct stat buf;
if (lstat(homeDir.c_str(), &buf) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
mkdir(homeDir.c_str(), 0755);
} else {
perror("cannot access home directory");
exit(1);
}
}
if (buf.st_uid != 0 || buf.st_gid != 0) {
// should be already owned by zerotier-one
if (targetUser->pw_uid != buf.st_uid) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: %s not owned by zerotier-one or root\n", homeDir.c_str());
exit(1);
}
return;
}
// Change homedir owner to zerotier-one user. This is safe, because this directory is writable only by root, so no one could have created malicious hardlink.
long p = (long)fork();
int exitcode = -1;
if (p > 0) {
waitpid(p, &exitcode, 0);
} else if (p == 0) {
std::string ownerString = std::to_string(targetUser->pw_uid) + ":" + std::to_string(targetUser->pw_gid);
execlp("chown", "chown", "-R", ownerString.c_str(), "--", homeDir.c_str(), NULL);
_exit(-1);
}
if (exitcode != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to change owner of %s to %s\n", homeDir.c_str(), targetUser->pw_name);
exit(1);
}
}
void dropPrivileges(std::string homeDir) {
// dropPrivileges switches to zerotier-one user while retaining CAP_NET_ADMIN
// and CAP_NET_RAW capabilities.
struct passwd* targetUser = getpwnam(TARGET_USER_NAME);
if (targetUser == NULL) {
// zerotier-one user not configured by package
return;
}
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, CAP_NET_RAW, 0, 0) < 0) {
// Kernel has no support for ambient capabilities.
notDropping(homeDir);
return;
}
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS | SECBIT_NOROOT) < 0) {
notDropping(homeDir);
return;
}
createOwnedHomedir(homeDir, targetUser);
if (setCapabilities((1 << CAP_NET_ADMIN) | (1 << CAP_NET_RAW) | (1 << CAP_SETUID) | (1 << CAP_SETGID)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: failed to set capabilities (not running as real root?)\n");
exit(1);
}
int oldDumpable = prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE);
if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) < 0) {
// Disable ptracing. Otherwise there is a small window when previous
// compromised ZeroTier process could ptrace us, when we still have CAP_SETUID.
// (this is mitigated anyway on most distros by ptrace_scope=1)
perror("prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)");
exit(1);
}
if (setgid(targetUser->pw_gid) < 0) {
perror("setgid");
exit(1);
}
if (setuid(targetUser->pw_uid) < 0) {
perror("setuid");
exit(1);
}
if (setCapabilities((1 << CAP_NET_ADMIN) | (1 << CAP_NET_RAW)) < 0) {
perror("could not drop capabilities after setuid");
exit(1);
}
if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, oldDumpable) < 0) {
perror("could not restore dumpable flag");
exit(1);
}
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, CAP_NET_ADMIN, 0, 0) < 0) {
perror("could not raise ambient CAP_NET_ADMIN");
exit(1);
}
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, CAP_NET_RAW, 0, 0) < 0) {
perror("could not raise ambient CAP_NET_RAW");
exit(1);
}
}
#endif
}