Commit Graph

16 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
iadgovuser29
85759dcf3f Fixed a couple errors in Impl.java and tests 2021-08-16 11:59:19 -04:00
Cyrus
c290ba25be Modified how unmatched log events are tested. Now it uses the reference event value from the database. 2021-03-23 13:13:17 -04:00
Cyrus
108748fb2a Undid some code and change the Digest Value class into a table in the database. This code then updates those values when a provision is initiated. At this time, that is all it does. 2021-03-19 11:01:25 -04:00
Cyrus
53cb300063 This is an initial commit with changes that add new classes for digest reference matching. 2021-03-17 10:23:08 -04:00
chubtub
88015df551 Checkstyle: unused import 2021-01-14 13:19:17 -05:00
Cyrus
164a43f056 These are unit tests that were not run on the merge request #327 for issue 308. The unit tests uses certificate (EC and 2 CAs) that don't match for SKI to AKI or issuer string fields. The O= field isn't required and the code in #327 was changed to use SKI first then a sorted RDN list. See #327. A note was left in the unit tests that the test certs need to be updated.` 2021-01-14 12:41:29 -05:00
Cyrus
62c7ca2d90 This PR is to address issue #308. The ACA was pulling Issuer Certificates using the organization RDN of the subject string and getting this from the issuer string of the EC or PC. This presents a problem because it isn't a required field. The organization field cannot be null or empty. Pulling objects from a DB using null or empty would produce bad results. The main change of this issue (which has not been full tested) is pulling using the AKI for the db lookup. If this fails, instead of falling back on potentially left out fields like the O= RDN, the ACA takes the issuer/subject fields, breaks them apart and sorts them based on the key. It also changes the case. This way the lookup can be assured to match in case of some random situation in which the issuer or subject field don't match because RDN keys are just in different positions of the string. 2020-12-11 14:47:46 -05:00
Cyrus
da5bc217ef
[#236] Firmware validation update part 2 (#259)
* Modified the hirs.data.persist package to have better fidelity into the objects necessary to create and maintain a baseline.  the info objects will be next.
2020-06-10 11:17:45 -04:00
Cyrus
2e07d2cfd7
The validation page was not showing an error icon for attributes failures. This was due to the retained validation type for attributes. This has been removed and the code was additionally updated with logic to handle showing just one icon for both policy checks for the platform credential. (#184) 2019-08-27 10:40:55 -04:00
Cyrus
7cfabe756d
[#166] Validation icon swap (#173)
* This pull request contains 2 main changes, the first is transferring the status text from the attributes failure to the icon specifically for platform trust chain validation.  Then this removes the third column on the validation page that singles out the icons for the attribute status.  In addition, this status is also rolled up to the summary status icon and displays the text there as well for all that have failed.  This last change meant a change to the sizes of the columns in the database.

The validation of a single base certificate with an error was not handled in the code base.  Due to the changes with the introduction of delta certifications, the validation was modified and only handled changes presented by the deltas and ignored errors in the base certificate.  This commit modifies the code that if there is just a single base certificate that is bad and error is thrown.
2019-08-02 09:41:44 -04:00
Cyrus
a8e2c5cc6e
[#163] Delta issuer validation (#164)
* This code change will add in the delta certficates to the platform validation check.  The current base passes the policy check as long as the base is valid.  The deltas are ignored.  This is because the validation pulls in what is associated with a particular EK associated with the machine provisioning.
2019-06-24 13:01:32 -04:00
Cyrus
157dcb649d
[#109] Delta Chain Validation (#151)
* This code adds functionality to check the delta certificates in a chain. The main operation validates that the delta belongs in that chain and then that the chain establishes correct component modification. No removes before an add, no add to a component that exists, no remove to a component that doesn't exist. The unit test was updated to not use any flat file certificate.

Closes #109

* Changes were made to the validation of a delta certificate based on newer information.  There can be multiple bases and multiple leaves in a tree of associated certificates.  However currently we don't have certificates to validate the entirety of the code to test.

* Updated the code to treat the platform attributes policy, if v2, against all in the chain rather than one at a time.
2019-06-04 14:07:35 -04:00
chubtub
86f2cddb22 [#108] Validity Check for Base and Delta Certs (#126)
* Added methods and placeholders for checking the supply chain for base and delta credentials according to the new TCG spec

Checkstyle changes

Created a new SupplyChainValidation.ValidationType for delta credential attributes. The existing PLATFORM_CREDENTIAL
ValidationType will be used for both base and delta platform credentials from spec 1.1.

* Checkstyle error: trailing spaces
2019-05-02 07:15:43 -04:00
apldev3
ce380db48c [#38] ACA checks uploaded EK Certs if one is not provided during provisioning 2018-11-01 09:30:01 -04:00
apldev3
87be5a396b [#25] Make ACA exception handling more descriptive 2018-10-31 09:26:20 -04:00
apldev4
d7e44b8310 Initial release 2018-09-06 09:47:33 -04:00